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Summary findings
The old days  in the now transition societies  were  Euroscderosis  (a possibility  for Hungary  or Poland).
characterized  by stagnant incomes,  rationed goods, and  Under either scenario, those whom the transfers are
few civil  liberties,  but a high degree of income security.  supposed to protect - the old, the poor, the disabled,
The early days of reform have  brought crashing  incomes,  and the unemployed  - are most likely to suffer
more goods, civil  liberties,  and rising  insecurity.  Most  disproportionately  over the medium  to long tcrm, and
countries are set on a course toward some form of  probably even in the short rerm.
capitalism,  which by definition means greater risk-taking,  In any viable  scenario, transfers  are likely  to be
less  security,  and almost certainly  greater inequality  in  important for both welfare and political reasons.  Some
income distribution.  options for providing  transfers  are more likely  to be
Should transfers bc used to compensate for increasing  consistent  with macroeconomic  imperatives  and to have
insecurity  and poverty?  The short-rmn  drop in incomes,  relatively  low adverse-incentive  effects  - for example,
the heritage of cradle-to-grave  state protection, and the  flat-rate (or flatter) pensions  at quite low replacement
Westem European vision of the welfare  stare provide  rates, and local rather than general (income-tested)  social
compelling  motivation  for using  transfers.  assistance.
But, argue Krumni,  Milanovic,  and Walton, there are  Krumm,  Milanovic,  and Walton recommend  using
significant  tradeoffs  between moving  to a welfare  state  intrinsically  temporary measures  - such as temporary
and shifting  to dynamic,  growing  economies.  The  employment schemes  - in the transition. This avoids  a
transition economies  don't have the real levels  of  permanent transfer burden while recognizing  the severity
productivity  or the tax bases  needed to sustain the kind  of the interim transition period. In sum, the altemative
of tax effort a large-scale  system  of transfers would  of less  reliance on . omprehensive  transfers puts more
require Short-run gains in security  could in the long run  pressure on private coping  mechanisms  and will, in the
mean insufficient  private and public  capital accumulation  short run, increase  risk But it may be the price of a
and lack of competitiveness.  The result could be financial  viable transition to the growth that is essential  to success.
collapse (as  witnessed in Ukraine) or an extreme form of
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INTRODUCTION
There were many things wrong with the socialist systems that evolved this century. They
brought, however, three significant  benefits relative to market economies  of a comparable income
level; high levels of health and education; a relatively high degree of income security; and low
incidence of income aspects of poverty. Of course, the failures of the economic system meant
the prospects for income growth were dim; and income security is only some comfort when you
can't buy the goods you want. Yet a rise in insecurity is a striking feature of the initial phase of
the transition to capitalism.
A rise in income insecurity occurred because of the combination  of macroeconomic crash
and the beginnings of the removal of comprehensive security via labor contracts. It coincided,
of course, with a rise in psychological insecurity brought about by the profound changes.  At the
same time, private and community based coping mechanisms were weak while the relative size
of the dependent  old was large.  The interaction between these features and inherited institutional
support schemes has led to a high reliance on state transfers for those without labor income. The
result  bears  considerable similarity  to  Western European style welfare states.  There  are,
however,  sharp tradeoffs faced by these economies that may make the maintenance of large
tansfer  levels tough.  This is already vividly apparent in the macroeconomic realm, with the
two,  inter-related tradeoffs of fiscal resource allocation, and ensuring enough resources for
investment in human and physical capital accumulation. There are also likely to be more subtle
tradeoffs in the effects of  ransfers on labor allocation.
This paper reviews the transfer situation in the context of these tradeoffs.  Part I sketches
the institutional features of the legacy that brought these benefits, and the changes in the early
days of the Brave New post-sociaLst World.  Those familiar with this context may wish to skip
this.  Part  II describes the principal tradeoffs, with a primary focus on the macroeconomic
context; and then discusses how market economies have responded to these tradeoffs.  Part m
looks at two programs that will be key to any solution to the tradeoffs-pensions  and social
assistance.Transfers and The Transition From Socialism: Key Tradeoffs
I.  THE SOCIALIST  TRANSFER  LEGACY  --  AND NITIAL  CHANGES
The legacy:  high income security; stagnant incomes
Social insurance and the  role of  enterprises.  Social insurance in  the rich Western
economies manages insecurity (and usually also redistributes to the poor) mainly through a tax
and tnsfer  system. It is a response to the fact that the underlying economic system generates
uncertain and changing outcomes for households--and the scope for households to manage these
changes on their own is often limited. The socialist system was different: socializing such risks
was taken care of directly through a labor "market" that provided an employment guarantee with
low wage dispersion.  This was complemented by a range of transfers,  mainly implicitly or
explicitly part of the  employment contract,  included family allowances, maternity benefits,
disability benefits, various benefits in kind and, most importantly, pensions.
Full employment was ensured in part as  a matter of direct policy.  Job security was
guaranteed and unemployment usually actually illegal. However, full employment was only
feasible because of structural features causing chronic excess demand for labor. Production by
target with no budget constraint led to unlimited demand for labor in the enterprise sector. There
was every incentive to expand employment, and none to economize  on labor use. Labor urnover
was actually quite high, but this  was because workers operated in a  seller's  market. Full
employment  obviated the need for unemployment  insurance. Employees  were paid relatively low
net wages with particularly low returns to education. In addition to their central role in providing
the employment guarantee, a number of social functions devolved to enterprises, particularly in
the countries of the former Soviet Union,  including provision of many social services.  The
enterprises often provided to their employees goods in short supply, and a considerable amount
of compensation was in-kind (housing, food, other subsidies) rather than as part of the explicit
wage package.  The enterprises were responsible for paying out family allowances and pensions
(although the financing came from the state).  Economic fisk-talkng was discouraged.  The
environment was one of very low risk in almost all spheres - except when failing to toe the
political line.
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions were received by all those who worked in the state
sector, as well as generous sickness allowances and family benefits.  These were fmanced in
large part by payroll taxes, that had reached  levels ranging from above 30 percent in parts of
the former Soviet Union to close to 50 percent in much of Central and Eastern Europe at the
time of transition, with supplements as required from the national budgets. Pensionable age was
low (commonly 55 for women and 60 for men),  with a large number of privileged groups
enjoying even earlier retirement rights. Compounding  this, dependency  ratios are higher because
of declining birth rates and relatively mature population profiles across the region.  Pensions
were not actuarially  calculated. In Eastem Europe, pensions  as a percentage of state-sector wages
tended to be high (around 60-65 percent), while in the former Soviet Union they were relatively
lower (around 40 percent),. Because of the virtual absence of private ownership of wealth and
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limited context for interhousehold transfers in a largely urbanized and small family society, the
elderly relied heavily on pensions.
The  poor: and attitudes to them.  Social assistance for the poor played a highly subsidiary
role. The employment guarantee, widespread transfers, free or almost free health and child care
and education, combined with high labor force participation rates for women and subsidization
of essential products, were the principal instruments for prevention  of poverty. Neither in terms
of its size nor concentration on the poor did social assistance have the role that it typically has
in the rich Western countries. In part this was due to the fact that poverty was not widespread,
and in part to the ideological taboo that preferred not to see poverty, since in an ideal socialist
system poverty would be eliminated. Anti-poverty policy thus dealt ornly  with "excess" cases of
alcoholics, handicapped, etc.  and was undertaken half-heartedly by  local authorities or,  if
tolerated, by charitable organizations (e.g. in countries where Church involvement, as in Poland,
was impossible to prevent).
While there was sympathy for those amongst the poor that were perceived to be the
victims of the previous system (e.g. rural illiterate and poor, unskilled urban workers etc.) there
was little  sympathy for  the  "socialist poor"-people  without steady jobs,  the  old  and/or
handicapped. The former,  the poor  from the  previous regimes, were  often helped by  the
Communists. During the first 10-15  years after the Communist  revolutions all socialist countries
achieved significant progress  in  the  eradication of diseases,  improved literacy  and school
enrollment, overall social mobility, that is in the indicators where the main beneficiaries were
precisely the underclass from the previous system. Not surprisingly, the "capitalist" poor, who,
under the new system, were given the chance to educate their children, migrate to cities, or make
successful careers in state- or Party-sponsored institutions, often proved the strongest supporters
of socialist regimes.
But, in regard to the "socialist poor" the authorities were generally cool. Not only did
the existence of the poor mock the regime's claim that poverty was a capitalist phenomenon,
commuunist  ideologues genuinely regarded such people as  aberrations. They  argued that if
everyone was guaranteed free schooling, to be followed by a steady state job and all the benefits
that go with it, if everyone could avail of generous family allowances, and, after retiring, could
enjoy adequate pension, then the fault for being poor lay with these people and not the system.
Poverty was not only viewed as social pathology and an implicit denial of the "perfectness" of
the system but-not  unlike in Calvinist ethics and Victorian attitudes to the poor-rather  as an
explicit anti-social choice by the poor ("the poor do not want to work" hence "they do not want
to contnbute to the building of the new society" hence "they  are anti-social elements, parasites").
The communist view had a logic: if perfect society is here, and its virtaes are self-evident, only
the ill-disposed and wicked people can refuse to participate in such an endeavor. Communist
authorities therefore encouraged the stigma in which other citizens anyway tended to hold the
poor.  And, to make their plight worse, communist authorities discouraged non-government
organizations from helping them, because they distrusted all non-governmental initiatives and
viewed them as politically motivated ploys to acquire influence  by helping the disenfranchised.
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The negative attitude toward the poor had practical consequences.  The authorities  entirely
lacked  experience  in  identifying  the  needy  and  in  delivering  social  support.  The  "social
minimum"  lines were  defined mostly  by the "armchair"  economists  and nutritionists  and  were
unrelated  to  any  social  policy.  Anti-poverty  policy  was  haphazard,  and  local  efforts  were
unintegrated  into the overall  economic  and  social  policy:  the poor were  viewed  as a  "foreign
body"  in an  otherwise  perfect  system.
Early days of refonn: heightened  insecurity;  faling  incomes
Households  were hit by multiple  shocks  in the early days in the Brave New World.  For
a variety  of reasons  output and incomes  crashed-mostly  tied up either  with the loss of external
markets  following the collapse  of Comecon  or the disorder  in resource  allocation  in the vacuum
between  plan and market.  And with  the removal  of the structural  basis  for excess  demand  for
labor,  the employment  guarantee  disappeared  and Western-style  unemployment  emerged  in all
countries.  (See  Figure  1). Countries  in Eastern  Europe  are well on the way to high
Figure  1.  Income  decline  and  unemployment  rise.
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unemployment. Those of the former Soviet Union  are at much earlier stage in the shakeout,
probably  because  managers  hesitated to lay off workers  in light of the social service network
provided  by the firm, and workers  preferred  to keep  formal  ties to firms  to increase  chances  of
participation  in the privatization  carve-up." Nonetheless,  hidden  unemployment  (those  effectively
laid off or without  pay, but not registered  as unemployed)  has begun to emerge,  estimated  at 9
percent in Ukraine  in 1993  and over 10 percent in Russia  in 1994.
Government  revenues  have  also come  under pressure, owing  to the fall in real incomes
and the pressure on enterprise  profits-the traditional  source of state cash-from higher wage
shares  and reduced  capacity  utilization  with  the loss in markets. Revenues  fell  sharply  in Eastern
Europe, while infonmation  on the historical  base for the former Soviet  Union  makes  analysis of
trends tough.  (See Table 1.)  Early results for 1993-94  suggest sharper additional  revenue
declines  in some countries  of the fonner Soviet  Union.
Table 1.  Government revenue and spending in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union
(in percent of GDP; unweighted)
Estern Europe  Former  Soviet  Unionc
1987  1992  1987  1992
Revenucsd  55  43  na  33
Spending'  54  49  37  43
Cash transfrs  10  15  7  8
Health and  6  9  10  10
eduation
a.  Given  the volatility  of exchange  rates it makes litle sense w use GDP weighing. Any kind of weighing  makes a big
difference-for  the.FSU, in view of dominance  of Russia; for example, the population-weighted  change in spending
was from 32 to 59 percent  of GDP between 1987  and 1992.
b.  Excludes the Czech  Republic  and Slovakia,  because  of difficulties  of comparison  with 1987.
c.  Excludes  Armenia  and Belaus because  of difficulties  of comparison  with 1987.
d.  Consolidated  general government  revenues and spending  plus extrabudgetary  social funds.
1f  Most  firms  in the transition  period  shifted  to some  form of de facto worker  ownership  operating  in collusion  with
managers-of  course  with  unclear  long-term  property  rights. There  is widespread  unpaid  leave  in  the former  Soviet  Union,
that is a temporary  substitute  for unemploymenL
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Figure 2.  Trends in major government  spending components, 1987-92
Figure  Z Structuto  of  Govenment  Expendifture
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How did countries  respond?  Most sustained  shares of resources  going  to spending  and
remain  to a large extent transfer  societies. Total spending  was still close to 50 percent of GDP
in Eastern  Europe  in 1992,  and actuafly  rose in the countries  of the former  Soviet Union. As
a share of GDP cash  transfers  increased  in Eastern  Europe,  and held steady  in the former  Soviet
Union. (See Table 1 and Figure 2).
Total spending  as a share of GDP remained higher than in OECD economies,  and
substantially  higher  than  in market  middle  income  economies-an  issue  we'll return  to in the next
section. This reflects a combination  of the legacy  of cradle-to-grave  public  support  system  and
the new shocks  of the transiton.
The table  and Figure  2 only  account  for explicit  transfers:  formal  transfers  to households
are of the order of 8 percent of GDP for the former Soviet  group and 15 percent for many
Eastern  European  countries.  There  were  relatively  marginal  reforms  of  inherited  socialist  systems
combined  with  introduction  of the dole for the unemployed.  But a large  component  of transfers
are implicit. State enterprises  remain in many ways part of the broader  transfer mechanism.
A significant part of the workforce is in unproductive activities, so wages (often financed by
quasi-fiscal  resources)  are tantamount  to a transfer. Where  high inflation  persists,  as in Russia,
credit to enterprises  and arrears are defacto transfers  from a public sector  banking  system  to
households  with wage eamers in unviable  jobs.  Eventually  the rest of the population  pays,
whether  via inflation  or other  taxation. These contiing  larger transfers  to enterprises  offset-
most  likely  more than offset-the lower  share  of explicit  transfers  in tde former  Soviet  Union  as
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compared  with most Eastern  European  countries. At the crux of the debate is how to contain
the overall magnitude  of explicit transfers while moving the responsibility  away from the
enterprise  sector to enable it to adopt  a commercial  orientation.
At the same  time, some  of the social  transfer  responsibilities  have  begun  to shift from the
enterprises  to the state. Facing harder budget constraints  and elimination  of tax benefits  that
favored "collective  consumption"  (i.e. fringe benefits  rather than cash wages)  the enterprises
began  shedding  these functions.  They stopped  subsidizing  canteens  and charging  below-market
prices, and started  selling  vacation  homes  and reducing  access  to free child care. Ideologically,
enterprises  are also pushed  in that direction  because  their new role in a capitalist  system,  is to
be producers  of goods  and services-not  appendages  of the state  protection  system.  Some  services
have not been replaced.  For child care, the state has reduced  subsidies,  and the new privately-
owned  child care is extremely  expensive.  The cost  of child  care may often  be equal to the wage
that a mother may expect to receive. Incentives  to leave the labor force can be strong, and in
many  countries  there has been  a reduction  in labor force  participation,  especially  of women  and
those near retirement  age.Y
While explicit transfers have been rising as a share of GDP, real transfer levels have
fallen, largely as consequence  of the real fall in incomes. Another  contributing  factor is the
extent to which  the removal  of subsidies  (that  were huge in many countries,  e.g. an estimated
15 percent of GDP in Bulgaria  in 1989-90)  were not compensated  with nominal  adjustments  in
transfer  levels.  (See Figure  3).  At the same  time, this decline  is partly  offset  by the shift away
from scarcity  of goods  with the liberalization  of prices.
The most important  component  of the cash transfer  system  continues  to be pensions.  In
most countries  no major  changes  in the pension  systems  have  been made, partly  because  of the
difficulty  of changing  a system  that directly  affects  the acquired  rights  of a large segment  of the
population.  However,  pension  schemes  have come  under pressure  everywhere,  with outcomes
mainly  dependent  on the extent to which  benefit  levels have  been eroded  by inflation.  In most
Central  and Eastern  European  countries,  pensions  have  been  rising  as a share  of GDP, with  early
retirement  and better protection  of pensions  than wages (for example,  between  1987  and 1992
from 7 to 15 percent of GDP in Poland, 9 to 10 percent in Hungary,  7 to 11 percent in the
Slovak  Republic).  In most of the former Soviet Union, unanticipated  inflation  has not been
matched  by increased  -benefits  levels or there have been delays in payments, with dramatic
declines  and compression  in real pension  levels.  This temporarily  has kept  pension  expenditures
down, and pension-related  funds in some  countries  have temporary  surpluses.
2/  There  are, of course, often  problem of measurement,  given the weak state  of data  collection  on informal  activities,  and
the less-than-learcut  distinction  between  the openly  unemployed  and discouraged  workers.
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Figure 3:  Real Levels  of Transfers In Eastern Europe and the FSU
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A few countries  have introduced  modest  changes.  Estonia,  RomanLia  and Slovenia  have
started  to increase  the retirement  age. While pensioners  who continue  worldng  have not been
excluded  in any of the reforms, Poland  and Romania  have  made  adjustments  for other income.
Some  attempts  have  been made  to protect  the minmum pension  levels  to reduce  the emergence
of poverty  among  the elderly, frequently  relating  the minimum  pension  to the minimum  wage.
Administratively  simple  benefit schemes  have been introduced  in the Baltic  countries  with the
intoduction of flat-rdte  minimum  pensions, but as these economies  stabilize, pressures are
reemerging  to restore  entitlements.  Perhaps  of  greatest  quantitative  significance,  the Baltic  states
have effectively  inflated away pension "entitlements"  linked to historical work experience.
However,  in all the transition  economies,  the system's  main characteristics  remain  in place-pay-
as-you-go,  state-run  and state-mandated  pensions  with only a limited  role for private pension
schemes,  and with some  redistribution.
Attempts  have also been made to restrict some other cash transfers, such as sickness
benefits,  maternity  leave  and sometimes  family  allowances. For example,  sickness  allowances
are being  paid, for the early part of the sick  leave,  by enterprises  rather than  by social  insurance
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funds and maternity leave has been reduced in duration. Some countries have introduced income-
testing for family allowances, for example, a single income trigger after which family allowances
will cease to be paid (in Kyrgyzstan). Jn some cases, family allowances are being discontinued
for children older than (say) 18 years of age (currently they are often paid in respect of children
up to 25-26 years of age).
All  but  absent in  the  previous  system,  the dole  is  being  introduced via  two  new
instruments, unemployment  insurance and, effectively, through social assistance. Unemployment
insurance was in almost all countries introduced at the beginning of the transition-only  some 3
to 4 years ago. Its design raised difficult questions on the interaction between social insurance
schemes (family  allowances andunemploymentbenefits) and social assistance. Initially in Eastern
Europe  the  problem  was  whether  unemployment  benefits,  fixed  after  some  period  of
unemployment (say, after 9 to  12 months) at the subsistence level, should be used in lieu of
social assistance. The idea was appealing because it would dispense with the need to introduce
yet another new scheme (income-tested social assistance). The drawback, however, was that the
unemployed and the poor were not necessarily the same. The idea of open-ended  unemployment
benefits was soon abandoned, and replaced everywhere with benefits whose duration was limited
to about a year or less. (Poland recently increased the period of coverage for some regions to
one and  a  half years).  Most  systems of unemployment insurance provide earnings-related
benefits, though the Baltic countries and Poland provide flat-rate benefits (15-20 percent and 36
percent, respectively of the average wage). In the former Soviet Union, benefit levels have been
extremely low, for example, about 13 percent of the average wage in Russia compared with
replacement ratios in the range of 50-70 percent in most of Eastern Europe.  While eligibility
has been tightened since the introduction of the system, it remains generous in most countries,
with effective coverage exceeding 60 percent of  the unemployed in  Romania, Poland and
Hungary, while ffie Czech Republic has imposed relative strict requirements.  In a number of
countries, unemployment compensation is preceded by  severance payments financed by the
enterprises.  This ranges from payments of 2-6 months r-ages mandated in the former Soviet
Union and countries such as Slovakia and Poland to more limited use in countries such as
Hungary.
As for social assistance, at the beginning of the transition, some countries considered
introducing income-tested social assistance. Such systems are in place in the Czech and Slovak
Republics. embryonic in Poland and Hungary and under serious consideration in a number of
other countries.
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II.  THE ROLE OF TRANSFERS  IN TE  TRANSrriON  AND  BEYOND:
CHOICEs AD  TRADEOm
Most formerly socialist countries had large transfers under socialism and are relying
heavily on transfers in the transition, with growing explicit transfers in Eastern Europe and
implicit  transfers through the enterprise sect-rr  abating only gradually (with the financial sector
an intrinsically temporary staging post) in the former Soviet Union.  What are the strategic
choices for transfers?  What are the key tradeoffs among them?
The key issue is the relationship  between transfers, security and growth. After all, being
market-based is pretty pointless, from an economic perspective, if it confers greater insecurity
without growth. All the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have had to
suffer rapid initial declines in recorded output, so large future gains are going to be essential to
restore welfare (under a narrow  definition-there have already been gains in liberty).  We look
at this from three angles here. In the first subsection, we look at the potential overall tradeoff
between comprehensive transfers and growth-we  argue the costs could be quite high, with
economies  risldng a scenario of either a collapsing economy (and collapsing transfer systems)
or of a slow-growing, sclerotic economy (but with continuing transfer systems).
At the same time, aren't there "needs" for high tansfers during the transition that would
then decline once the transition to a market-based economy has been made?  This is reviewed
in the second subsection.  If there is an initial sharp reduction of income, the value of transfers
rises-since  the income fall increases the depth and extent of poverty.  Political economy
considerations  are also of great importance  here.  This is clearly a case of weighing he present
against the future, but with the tradeoff considerably shariened compared with conditions of
"normal" growth.
So  what are  the  strategic  options for  recognizing the  particular transitional needs
consistent with  a  medium-tern  growth  strategy?  In  the  third  sub-section we  see  what
international  experience may have to offer. Much of the focus in comparative analysis to date
has been with mature OECD economies. This is seductive. An important part of the group in
transition are European and some of the features of their transfer systems are like the welfare
states that OECD  countries have to varying degrees. However, the similarities  may be misleading
(with the exception of the large share of old).  Many of the OECD economies who themselves
have  been at the forefront of transfer societies-Germany, Sweden-also are actively reconsidering
the generosity of their welfare system.  Hence, we also look at what other successful middle-
income economies do  in  the  way of  support mechanisms and transfers.  We  discuss the
applicability of both OECD and middle income country experiences to questions of transfers
strategy for formerly socialist countries.
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Requirementsfor  income  growth  and implications  of the present  path - sclerosis  or collapse?
Most people in both rich and poor countries would agree that both growth in  living
standards and security are desirable.  What goes into living standards and security will be a
mixture of many things, including incomes, public services, the environment in which people live
and political and personal freedoms. We concentrate on two objectives:
*  providing for income growth;
*  providing for income security.
These are  dependent on each other.  Providing income security may prove difficult
without  income growth;  and some degree of income security may be necessary to provide an
environment for investment, to allow restructuring and prevent losses in human capabilities.
The income security objective is actually frequently used to conflate two related issues (notably
in the social insurance schemes of developed economies): insurance against declines in incomes
of a household; and the avoidance, or reduction, of poverty.  For the former, protection against
income declines, the link with income growth in the economy is particularly strong for economy-
wide shocks.  For example, the value of the assets set aside for insurance purposes would be
negatively affected by  negative shocks to the economy, just when households would want to
liquidate those assets to protect their income. The latter, poverty reduction, can be effected by
redistributive transfers, but here the links with growth are even stronger.  All the international
experience suggests that the most effective way of permanendy reducing poverty  is through
success income  growth. Ln  assessing  tradeoffs, for example across alternative categories of public
spending, it is important to take account  of both growth and security effects. Education spending
may be competing with pensions for the use of (declining) public revenues. While education  has
little short-run effect on the incomes of the poor,  it may be central to future poverty declines.
What is the growth framework underpinning the transition? It is useful to put the choices
and tradeoffs into a simple accounting framework.  The government extracts a certain fraction
of  GDP  in  revenues  that  finace  government  spending on  current  services,  transfers  or
investment.  Since publicly managed social security is never linked to individual insurance
contributions in transition economies, we can think of them as tax-financed transfers to various
groups, not necessarily pour (with, as we have seen, payroll taxes being the principal source of
finance). The remaining part of GDP in the non-government sector in allocated between current
consumption  and imvestment. Future growth will be driven by investment of the private sector
in productive activities, by households in human capital and by government spending in (market-
friendly)  physical  investment,  especially  in  economic  infrastructure  and  human  capital
investment, especially in education  and health.  It may be useful to think of provision of transfers
involving a tradeoffs with higher taxes and lower spending  related to capital accumulation. The
latter interaction can either work via the government  budget, with higher transfers leading to
lower market-friendly infrastructure, public health and education spending for given revenues;
or via private investment behavior, through the costs of higher taxation or the lower returns due
to less publicly provided capital.  Of course, it always desirable to reduce wasteful spending in
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nonproductive activities, whether by public, state enterprise or private activities, but that tends
to be a less interesting choice  (and often a relatively  elusive one).
Given the growth framework,  how could things unfold on the present policy path?  Two
illustrative scenarios can be envisaged, that depend on the initial political and  institutional
conditions,  the extent  of external  shocks and the effectiveness of reform  in other areas.  These
are illustrated  in Figure  4 and outlined  below.
Figure 4.  Collapse, sclerosis and radical  reform
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Scerotic  economy; continuing transfer systems.  For some of the transition economies-in
Eastern Europe Poland, the Czech Repubiic and Hungary-the economy looks reasonably solid.
Enterprises  and others pay taxes.  The unemployed and pensioners  receive transfers, albeit some
of them at a reduced rate.  The private  sector is taking off, especially relative to the state
enterprise sector. However, there is a more subde potential problem. Private sector growth
becomes confined to once-off adjustment to new opportunities  or,  at best, the grey economy
because of the weight on competitiveness of payroll taxes for formal sector workers,  and
insufficient  resources for public  sector related capital  accumulation.  There is significant  hysteresis
in unemployment (i.e. an irreversible once-off rise) and permanently high transfers levels.
Broad-based pay-as-you-go pension schemes are a permanent burden on the economy.  The
economy  looks like a caricature of the Eurosclerotic state-with slow growth especially in formal
employment, continuing deep pressures on public finance, and periodic fiscal crises, but at a
much lower level of income.
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This result can be put quite starkly in terms of the growth accounting framework.  Taxes
are absorbing 45 percent of GDP in many Central and Eastern European economies (see Table
1).  These go almost entirely to current spending and transfers, with almost zero savings  and
investment (with the small amounts largely financed by government's foreign borrowing).  To
get dynamic private sector growth, investment of 25-30 percent of GDP is not inappropriate, say
10 percent from the govermnent and 15-20 percent from the private sector (mainly enterprises,
but also households).  These numbers clearly don't add, either for the fiscal or private sector
accounts. Taxes  are if anything  on the way done; raising them, even if feasible, would absurdly
squeeze a private sector that is supposed to be favored in the transition. Alternatively, fl
fnancing  of the investment from private sources would leave only 25-30 percent of GDP for
consumption out of nongovermment  income, implying a savings ratio for the private sector of the
order of 50 percent!  With a 45 percent tax ratio and close to zero government savings, even an
impressive 30 percent  savings rate out of private income would only generate a  15 percent
investment rate.  This might be enough to produce positive per capita growth, but not for a
narrowing of the income gap with higher income countries.
Collapsing  economy;  collapsing  transfer  systems.  For  many  transition  economies,
attempts to continue extensive transfer systems merely contribute to crisis and a disorderly loss
of entitlements.  This is the more likely scenario for  countries incapable of sustaining the very
large public intermediation of fimds required of a high tax-high transfer economy. The attempt
to maintain aggregate spending levels in the  40-50 percent range  fail,  in tne  wake of  the
enterprise profits collapse and the broader flight from tax payments, compounded by attempts
to finance implicit transfers via credit to the enterprise sector.  A number of things are then likely
to happen: financing of the government and enterprise sector is increasingly by arrears; sooner
or later there is a fiscal-financial crisis;  there is some combination of crowding out of many
'discretionary" categories of public spending (like investnent, schooling  and drugs!)  and inflating
away wage and transfer claims; finally there is a severe defacto loss of entitlement for transfer
recipients and creation of an extreme form of an Italian tax mentality. One of the characteristics
of dtis  state is that actual public sector payments, including for transfers, fall short of planned
levels. Components of such a scenario are in the making in a number of transition economies.
Ukraine's disorder has already taken the economy to the brink of financial collapse and erased
seeming entitlements for transfers. Russia runs the risk of letting credit to enterprises cause a
fiscal crisis that could radically cut into spending for services  and transfers.  Bulgaria has already
partly inflated away many claims, and is heading toward an arrears-financed economy, and a
financial collapse in the enterprise sector could precipitate a broader fiscal crisis.
In terms of the growth accounting framework, tax revenues are collapsing to, say, 30
percent of GDP.  Government spending-again,- almost exclusively on  current spending and
transfers-declines  to, say,  35 percent of GDP, with a heavy reliance  on the inflation tax.
Transfers decline sharply ex post-as  inflation quickly erodes the value of nominal transfer
payments-to under 10 percent of GDP. But this decline is disorderly and not targeted on the
most vulnerable groups.  But in addition, the quasifiscal  accounts are large, including subsidies
to enterprises channelled through the central bank. Therefore, total extraction of resources from
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the economy and total spending by the public sector may, for some periods, be even larger than
the 45-50 percent or so in the sclerosis scenario.  Whether the private sector receives more or
less of a share of GDP than under the sclerosis scenario, the incentive for private investment is
shot through by the lack of credibility of overall economic management, and  private investment
will be much  lower than the 15 percent of GDP that seemed to be the maximum attainable in
the in the sclerosis scenario (which itself was inadequate for the growth requirements of the
transition).
If these indicative scenarios are right, the comprehensive transfer systems in place can
jeopardize  the ability to  shift  resources  into investment to provide  for reasonable growth
(sclerosis scenario) and can also fail to utilize the ex post  lower level of transfers in an orderly
and equitable fashion (collapse scenario).  Figure 4 also illustrates a third alterative, of more
radical reform, perhaps best exemplified by the Baltic countries. We discuss the ways to achieve
this below.  But first, let's go beyond the simple growth accounting framework to examine the
tradeoffs faced. The choice between allocations of resources between transfers and investment
is about the respective value attached to these spending categories and the costs incurred by the
need to tax to effect the transfers.  An overall intertemporal framework for a middle income
market  economy is  provided by  Bourguignon (1990).  On  plausible  assumptions for  the
distortionary costs of taxation, Bourguignon found that the costs of transfers in income growth
once an economy reached its steady long run growth path were very small.?" Transfers make
sense if the society places a higher value on raising incomes of the potential transfers recipients
than others,  even after the tradeoff between present consumption and investment in  future
consumption is accounted for.  (Note that Bourguignon  sets the issue up in terms of poor and
non-poor, but the same applies if the consumption of any potential transfer recipient-e.g.  a non-
poor pensioner-is relatively highly valued.)
But as we move away from such a long-run growth path, thngs change, even for the
relatively moderate transitions experience by  market economies . First,  if there is a need to
move to a new growth path (whether due to a permanent adverse shock or because the existing
growth path is distorted) the value of spending that speeds the move to the new path rises.
Delays in such a transition mean a longer period on an unsatisfactory growth path. This can be
thought of in terms of spending on the kinds of (human and physical) capital that will be needed
on the new path.
Think  now of the  conditions of  a transition economy that we outlined above.  The
structure  is  exactly the  same  but  with  sharp differences in  the  (probable) values  of  the
31 Bourguignon  used values for initial conditions, of revenue, incomes and investment  rates  approximating  that of a middle
income country (Venezuela  was taken as an example) and plausible values  for the distortionary  costs of taxation. leakages to
the non-poor  from transfers and the return and investment  and moderate transfers (in the 2-5 percent of GDP range) and a
long run equilibrium  framework  to denonstrate that the costs of transfers in income  growth could be very srnall in such a
contexL
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parameters.  Because  of the initial conditions,  the tradeoff  between  the future and present is
going  to be steeper, for three reasons.  First, revenues  are so high as to be highly  distortionary.
The difficulties  govermments  have in preventing  revenue  declines--even  with VAT and payroll
tax rates that are unusually  high-is a clear indication  that they are in a situation  in which the
marginal  costs  of taxation  are very high.  (This is only  another  way  of saying  that it makes  sense
for the economies  to move to lower revenue efforts.) Second, the scale of transformation
required  is very much greater, and the key to this is expansion  of private  sector activity. The
costs of delays  in the transition  to a new growth  path are correspondingly  higher. 7hird,  while
both public  infrastructural  capital  and the human  capital  of the population  may  be above  average
for market developing  countries of comparable  income levels, there are quite large open
questions  as to the value  of this capital.  Some  of the infrastructure  may  be inappropriate  for new
economic  directions  (e.g. transport  routes heading  toward Comecon  rather than the West) and
skill mixes  were designed  to suit the economies  with over-developed  smokestack  industries  and
underdeveloped  service sectors. Even with substantial  private activity in these areas, public
investment  will be important.
These  three factors  all point to a much  greater  need to shift  resources  into investment  in
the future, relative  to the market developing  case, and relatively  high costs of the allocation  of
resources  to transfers  (we  tun in the next subsection  to the benefits  of transfers  in the transition).
The tradeoffs between  growth and transfers faced by transition economies  are the same in
character,  as for those of other  economies.  But they are steeper. As we discuss  below  the need
is greater,  but the costs are higher, since  the success  in moving  to productive  structures  that can
compete  in the global  economy  will critically  determine  future income  growth  and security  (and
poverty  decline)  and because  large changes  in the capital  stock  are necessary.
Comprehensive  transfers also have important  tradeoffs with labor market incentives.
They are likely  to affect  a range of household  choices. For example,  the option  to retire early
leads to more people  choosing  to become  pensioners. Unemployment  benefits  allow more to
remain  unemployed.  More  broadly,  public  transfer  schemes  can substitute  for  a range of coping
mechanisms  to the adverse  shock of, for example,  losing a job in a state enterprise.  It sounds
harsh  to emphasize  coping  over caring.  Certainly  some  transfers  will  be essential.  But the whole
thrust of this paper is that there are steep  tradeoffs  that have to be faced-
For a relatively  poor country, transfers are even more problematic-and  not only for
financial reasons. If benefits are introduced at the subsistence  level, the gap between the
minimum  benefits  and the minimum  wage  (which,  in trn,  canmot  often  be pitched  much higher
than the subsistence)  becomes  so small  as to discourage  work effort.  Such  a small  difference  in
income between working  and not worldng will then require extremely  detailed policing of
individual  circumstances  (in order to weed out people who should be disqualified  for the
Al Ther  is next to no evidence  on the marginal distortionary  costs of taxation in market developing  countries
(Bourguignon's  modding work used a rough figure derived from estimates of the average cost), let alone in  transition
economies.  But in the meantime.  judgments on policy ChDices  have to  be made.
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guaranteed  income). This  effort  is  not only  beyond administrative capacities of  transition
economies, but beyond the capacities of probably any economy. This is because the incentive
afforded by higher work income (compared to not working) which exist  in developed countries
and leads people to select work,  thereby  "eliminating" them from the purview of transfer
programs, will be absent in a poor economy wi  guaranteed minimum benefits.
Table 2 illustrates this point. The gradient of incomes-moving from guaranteed income
to average wage-is  much sharper in developed economies. The ratio between minimum wage
and poverty line ranges  from 8 in the UK to more than 3 in the US.  It is not, nor can it be,
much above 1 in transition economies.  Developed economies can afford  guaranteed  social
protection  not only because they  are  richer  (and  thus  can  pay people not to  work),  but
because wages are  much higher and many people voiuntarily  choose to work rather  than
try  to  daim  the  benefit.  In other  words,  many people  in the West,  even if  offered the
guaranteed minimlm income would not take it since it would entail substantial losses of income
(true even for people who earn minimum wage). But if faced with the choice of practically equal
minimum wage or guaranteed income, many people would choose the latter. And this would
precisely be the situation in transition economies.
Hence, the nature of the tradeoffs suggests that continuing (or attempting to contiue)
extensive trsfer  systems could create  intrinsic long-term  problems.  These are likely to interact
nastily in the transition with the enterprise and labor market problems that characterize most
transition economies.
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Table 2. Dollmr incomes per day
(1992-93)
Poverty line  Mininum  Unemployment  Minimum  Average  Ratio




France  7  17  33  47  4.7
uS  <10  21  31  65  3.1
UK  5  6  9  32  47  8.4
Sweden  8  19  56  63
W.German  9  82
Portugal  3  3  8  8.5  18  3
Russia  1  0.8  n.a.  0.2  3  less than 1
Latvia  0.6  0.85  0.8  0.8  4  1.3
Estonia  ~  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.8  3  1.3
Poland  2  2  2.5  3  7  1.5
Nates:  PoverEy  line  per capita for a family  of four individuals.  The US effective  poverty  line is less: approximaely  $10 per
capita per day is the federal ('accounting') level which is not used for payments  in all states. For Russia, Ministry  of Labor
line; for Poland  and Portugal, this is minimum  pension  (not a guarantzed  income);  for Larvia.  the WB suggested  poverLy  line.
Unemployment  benefits  in the UK, Poland, Latvia and Estonia (6 months only) are flaL For the US average unemployment
benefit  (but lasting  9 months against 12 montis in other  countries);  for Sweden  average  benefit  for 1989. For Russia, the data
are from  November  1993.  For minimum  wage,  hourly  amounts  are converted  into  monthly  amounts  (assuming  22 worling days)
and then divided by 30. For all East European  countries and Russia, the data are at the end of 1993. Estonian  data from
Vodopiver (1994).
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Transfer  "needs" during the transition
So far the discussion  focused  on the opportunity  costs of devoting  resources  to transfers.
These  look  to be high. We now turn to the value  and importance  of transfers  for the transition
economies. These are also unusually  high.  Where  there is an initial reduction the value of
transfers  rises-since the income  fall increases  the depth  and extent of poverty.
For  transitional  economies,  there  are three factors  that  point  in  the direction  of heightened
transitional  needs.  First, demographics:  the combination  of a large old population  and, for most
countries, the limited  character of extended  family  networks,  implies a prima facie  need for
provisioning  for the old that is likely to be larger than in middle income  market economies.
Second, the scale  of shock  has had  much  more  radical  effects  on the extent  and depth  of poverty.
With average  income  declines  in the range of 20-30  percent, it is probable  that most measures
of poverty  have gone up by 50-100  percent. 5 Third, the political  economy  of the transition  is
fragile, especially  in the wake  of the aggregate  shock  to incomes:  in a society  that placed  a high
value on reducing  poverty, the clear priorities  would  be to shift resources  away from the old
stuff  both into investing  in the future  and transfers  to the poor. However,  this may be offset  by
a combination  of a need  to reduce  income  insecurity  of the middle  class and in practice, greater
opportunities  for income  rises of some  of the new (or old) rich.
Hence, the transitional  period  itself is different.  The changes  are wrenching  at the level
of households  and private adaptive  mechanisms  to this kdnd of adversity may be weakly
developed. Moreover  the aggregate  fall in output  constitutes  a coincident  shock  to much of the
population  and economy, limiting the scope both for adjustments  through inter-household
transfers and for labor movement  to new areas and activities.  There are exceptions  to this
picture-the sudden  opening  up of opporunities  in services  probably  being the most important,
migration  to other countries  being another. 6 However,  the basic picture is one of widespread
rses  in 'needs" for transfers at a time when short-run pressures on revenues add to the
underlying  and desirable  structural  decline  in the tax efforts  (sharpening  firther the tradeoffs).
This is  clearly  a case of weighing  the  present  against  the future  but with  the tradeoff  considerably
sharpened.  Resources  for raising  incomes  of the targeted  group  in the rresent are in competition
with resources  that invest  in the future.
'nis  is a tradeoff  for the poor  and others temporarily  disadvantaged  by the transition,  as
well as for society  as a whole,  since  all the international  evidence  shows  that success  in poverty
reduction  comes  fundamentally  from getting  on to sustainable,  broad-based  growth  paths-that
is how East Asia got on to a fast path to eradication  of absolute  poverty-  For other targeted
5/  aThis  is purely  illustrative.  For economies  with  available  information  in  the  1980s  the  elasticity  of poverty  changes
with  respect  to average  income  or consumption  changcs  was  about two  (Ravallion,  Poverty  Comparisons.  1994). Given  the
flatness  of the income  distribution  (and  the  probable  disequalizing  changes)  elasticities  in transition  economies  are probably
higher.
Movement  of ethnic  Germans  to Germany.  Emigration  of Bulgarians  (mostly  ethnic  Turks)  is another-
17Transfers  and Tthe Transition  From Socialism:  Key Tradeoffs
groups in society (such as retirees) which may not benefit from future growth, te  tradeoff is
more problematic and depends on the value they place on future generations. If both the value
of transfers to the  targeted group and for investment has risen,  the relative value of other
spending must have gone down. What kind? In a simple framework, it is the consun;ution of the
non-poor. In the real world, it can be thought of the whole set of consumption and inmestment
spending tied up with the status quo: examples are wages of an overextended public sector; rents
to owners, managers and workers in inefficient  protected activities, investment in capital that is
only of high value on the old growth path. Once  we shift to the real world another point becomes
clear:  the  inter-generational choices  in  different  countries  will  be  reflected in  "political
feasibility" and shape the nature and extent of the reform of the social transfer society.
Cross-counhy Experience
In the last section we saw that transition economies  face sharp conflicts, between the need
to reduce transfers for adjustment and growth, and the need to keep or raise them to manage
welfare declines and political economy.  What does cross-country experience have to say?  In
this section we briefly review the debate on the role of the state, we compare spending levels
between transition and market economies and survey how other groups have dealt with the need
to  manage insecurity.  We look at both OECD and middle income experiences: some of the
institutional and demographic features of most of the transition group are like the OECD group;
but their incomes are those of middle income developing countries, so both sets of experience
may be relevant.
How much state action?  The transition economies are sharply reducing the role of the
state.  There has been an ongoing  debate on the appropriate  role and size of the state for a long
time.  It is useful  to go back to the two objectives  of promoting  income  growth  and promofing
income security in reviewing this. It is frequently said that the lessons of development history
support  a high  degree  of  consensus.7 However,  this  is probably  clearer  for  the objective  of
income growth than for the objective or providing for security.
The consensus position on how to promote growth goes something like this.  Sustinable
income growth and poverty reduction depends on a development process that involves both
employment  growth and expansion  in human capabilities. For employment  growth, private sector
performance and reliance on markets is key, though the public sector is often important in the
provision of economic infrastructure.  For expansion in human capabilities, the public sector is
key, especially in provision of basic health and education services, though this is often best in
combination with private provision and  finance, especially for the non-poor.  This position both
applies to the historical record of OECD economies, and the extraordinary rapid development
of the high-performing East Asian group. 8
The L991  World  Bank  World  Developnemt  Report  descnbed  a version  of this consensus.
a/  See World  Bank  (1993),  The  East  Asian  Miracle.
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There is less consensus,  however,  on where to draw the line between  state and private
action on issues relating to income security. For developing  economies, the 1990 World
Development  Report  on poverty  argued for a role for state  transfers,  especially  where this was
to prevent  a rise in poverty  due to an adverse  shock, whether  at the household,  community  or
economy  level. However, it did not recommend  the kind of comprehensive  system  of social
security  characteristic  of many  European  developed  economies,  and in its most  developed  form
in Scandinavia. Such systems always involve a mixture of insurance (e.g. against old age and
ri-health) and redistribution  (often within one instrument,  as in most pay-as-you-go  pension
schemes,  sometimes  explicitly  via a separate  instrument,  as with means-tested  benefits).
Others, most notably Dr6ze and Sen9,  have also argued the case for active governmental
involvement in provision of income security against adverse risks, and for the use of transfers
as one mechanism  for reducing poverty. They, in particular, contrast  the "growth-mediated
security"  of countries  such  as Korea with the "unaimed  opulence"  of the Brazils  of the world.
For Korea an effective  growth  strategy  has gone hand in hand with widespread  provision  of
public  social services  and government  activism  to deal with adverse  shocks.  For Brazil growth
was also fast, at least until the 1980s,  but social  services  and security  lagged  seriously  behind.
Dr&ze  and Sen also argue that poor countries  can pursue a strategy  of "support-led  security"
through  widespread  public  provision of social services and transfers, to achieve  broad-based
iinprovement  in the living  conditions  of the poor. Sri Lanka's famous achievements  in social
indicators are an example. However, they, like the World Bank, do not recommend for
developing  countries the introduction of the social security systems characteristic  of rich
European  countries.
Countries  in transition  have a different  set of initial  conditions,  as the previous  sections
outlined.  The state  took  charge  of both  growth  in  incomes  and security.  However,  while  the state
failed, at least for the long run, with respect  to income  growth, it did a pretty good job with
respect  to income  security  and social  indicators  (though  progress  was stalling  in the latter  years
of socialism.) Most transition  economies  have bought into the consensus  position  on income
growth.? Reduction  of the role of the state, creation  of a private enterprise  sector, provision
of the institutional  basis for functioning  markets, are all viewed  as at the core of the transition
to a growing  market economy. Not all appear to have the same model in mind. The Czech
Republic  looks  like it heading  toward  something  rather  more market-oriented  than  Chile; others,
perhaps Kazakhstan,  appear to be tempted by a somewhat  more activist East Asian model.
However, the direction  is clear and broadly in line with the consensus  position  on how  to
promote growth.  Moreover, there are modeis of successful  middle income  capitalist/mixed
economies  to draw on.
2/  See  Dr&ze  and  Sen, Hunger  and  P&U/c  Action.
iQI  China  is a partial  exception,  at least in rhetoric,  but is not  an area  of fbocus  here.
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As we have seen, things are different  with respect to income security. Since most
countries  have an inheritance  of a high degree  of state-provided  security  via the employment
guarantee,  it is scary to move to greater insecurity-for  both political  and social reasons-and
the response  has  been to undertake  relatively  marginal  reforms  of inherited  socialist  systems  to
deal  with the post-socialist  world. Here the  model  is closer  to the OECD  than middle  income
countries. We've argued above  that they face sharp  tradeoffs. While  different  societies  may
have  different  preferences  for security  (for examples,  most European  societies  appear  to place
a greater value  on security  than the United States),  the question  is how much can be afforded
without  large  losses  in growth,  and  provision  of other  public  services,  whether  for  drugs, schools
or roads.
Let's first look  at spending  levels  across  countries.  The share  of total resources  devoted
to public  spending  varies  enormously,  but is  strongly  linked  to both incomes  and socialist  status.
As Table 3 shows,  there  are wide variations  in spending,  but some clear  paterns.
Table 3.  Revenues, spending and socal transfers by country group
(in percent of GDP?;  unweighted)
Eastem Europeb  Former Soviet  OECDd  Middle  incomdl
Unioal
Revenues  42  33  35  25
Spending  49  43  40  29
Cash  transfer  15  8  16  3
Health  and  9  10  8  12
education
N=:
a.  As noted  for Table 1, population-weightcd  numbcrs  are notsignificandy  different  for BE  and FSU;  we avoid  GDP-weighted
for the tansition econonies because of issues with exchange mtes  so we do the same for the other groups for consistency;
population  and GDP-weighted  numbers  am not significandy  different  for OECD countries.  and. if anydtint, indicate  even
lower  state  involvement  for middle income  counuies, i.e.,, spending  at 21-22 percent of GDP, cash vansfers at 2 percent
of GDP. and health  and education  at 5 percent  of GDP.
b.  1992.  excludes  Czech Republic  and Slovalda.
c.  1992,  cxcludes  Armenia and Belarus.
d.  1991. 18 OECD counuies and 34 middle  incum counties.
In 1992, total spending as share of GDP in Eastern Europe was above OECD levels, and
in the FSU about the same (even  before substantial  continued "hidden" spending  in the enterprise
sector of FSU).  But there are very sharp differences with middle income countries.  Total
spending in transition economies  is nearly double  the levels in market developing  economies; the
comparison is even sharper if one uses population- or GDP-weighted  middle income country
figures.
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It is clearly a central question whether  the transition group should be looking more to the
middle income or OECD group to gauge what level of spending  on transfers is affordable--i.e
to illuminate the steepness of the tradeoffs faced.  In demographics most of the transition group
are more like the OECD: they have gone through the demographic transition, and consequently
have high  ratios of  old to  working age people.  However,  it  is worth noting that overall
dependency ratios are not unusually high for transition economies, compared with either the
middle income or OECD group.  What is different is that share of the old is very much higher.
Figure 5 illustrates this for Bulgaria (with Hungary, probably the maturest transition country,
demographically  speaking), Argentina, Belgium  and Korea. This should imply savings on some
transfers to children (most of which are  in the form of subsidies to education).  There is a
question of why the old should need more state-mediated  transfers than the young, though we
take that as a given, at least for the medium term, and especially for the group that have moved
more toward a nuclear family mode of social organization.  In the third section (see Box 4 on
Bulgaria) we illustrate some of the implications  for the level and structure of transfers.  The fact
that there is a bigh old age dependency ratio only strengthens the necessity for the labor force
to be on a path toward rapidly rising productivity.
Figure  5.  Dependency  ratios for Bulgaria,  Argentina,  Belgium and Korea
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With respect to incomes, however, the transition group are close to the middle income
group of market developing economies (and substantially below some, such as Korea).  As
Figures 6 and 7 shows from plotting total and cash public spending against incomes",  the
socialist group continues to be a clear outlier with respect  to income levels, with spending in
1992 substantially greater  than other economies of  comparable income levels.  Revenue is
11]  This  uses  the World  Bank's  estimates  of Purchasing  Power  Parity  incomes. These  are known  to be fraught  with
difficuldties,  but are the best  we have  for now. For the FSU  group,  comparison  at official  exchnge rates  would  push  thiem
fihaer toward  the low  income  group.
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already falling (Table 1) and must sooner or later pull spending  down with it. A central  question
is whether the income fall is temporary  or permanent. There are reasons for expecting  part to
be temporary: old tax bases are disappearing  while new taxes, such as VATs, take time to be
introduced. But they are moving toward a level closer to that of countries of a comparable
income  level. Is this desirable, or an unhappy consequence  of poor tax administrative  structures,
that could, in principle, be improved over time? We take the view here that it is a desirable
move: realization of the income-promoting  objective  will require an overal  tax burden that is
consistent with competitive  and productive labor forces i.e. more like that prevailing  already in
East Asian middle income economies, and showing strong signs of prevailing in the Latin
American successes of the 1990s. This is confirmed by recent research which indicates that
growth is 1-1.2 percent less for every 10 percentage points of GDP in extra spending (see
Easterly, 1994). If we take an average expenditure  for middle income countries at 25 percent,
the transitional countries' expenditures  are some 20 percentage points higher. This translates
into an expected loss of 2 percent of GDP growth per year - tking  into account  that the high
levels of spending are not now caused by high investment  levels.
Figure 6.  Incomes and total spending; transition,  OECD and middle income countries
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What did high spending  mean for relative spending  on transfers? In general the share of
national income devoted  to direct  transfers was somewhat  below OECD stadards,  but, from the
limited  amount of information  available for middle income countries,  appears to be unusualy
high for the income level.  The average level of resources devoted to cash transfers was 15
percent of GDP for Eastern Europe and 8 percent for the countries of the former Soviet Union
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(and this excludes implicit transfers through the enterprises), compared with 16 percent for
OECD and a mere 3 percent for the middle income developing  economies. (Table 3.) Even
relatively  high transfer Latin  America  countries  are substantially  lower, with 3 percent for Costa
Rica and 4 percent for Argentina. Korea, with a substantially  higher income than the transition
group, devoted 2 percent; in the Middle East, Tunisia spent 5 percent of GDP.
Figure 7:  Government Spending on Cash Transfers,  Various Countries
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The story  on social  spending  in  kind is somewhat  differenlt  The socialist  economies  had
high  levels  of government  spending  on health  and education,  but do not appear  to be signiiant
outliner  with  respect  to income  levels  (igue  8). Total  levels  of spending  (including  private  and
enterprise  spending)  on tese  sectors  would  probably  show  a similar  story, thougSh  it is  tough  to
get information  on this: the socialist  group also had substantial  levels of spending  by the
enterprise  sector, while te  market group have-  substantial  levels of  private  spending. 12
Moreover,  in some  countries,  these  have  been heavily  squeezed,  owing  to the real decline  in
governmnent  spending, and, perhaps  of greater importance,  a decline in quality  because  of
problems  with  provision  of non-salary  ipts,  especially  drugs  in the former Soviet  Union.
12/  For  examplt  for  developing  countries  only  half  of total  spending  on  health  (of  some  5 percent  of O;DP)  wals  by  the
government  (WDR93).
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Figure  8: Government  spending  on health  and education,  various  countries
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It is -not possilble  to prercisely  define thie  best size of state spending.  This depends on
preferences, and different markfet  economies  have similar degrees of success (or failulre)  with
differing  levels of public spending. HIowever,  it does depend  on  taxcable  capacity,  and the extent
lo whiuch  higher taxes have costs for efficiency  and growth. Almost all the tranition  economics
(with  the pardal exception of Russia) are essentially  small trading nations whose fuature  growth
in labor incomes  depends  critically on competitiveness  in the international  markrets.  There simply
isn't sufficient  pbysical capital to susai  the productivity  necessary  tD SUppOrt competitivreness
and large tax burdens. In addition, a high tax syst.em  provrides  an incentive not to pay taxes,
creating the basis to move toward a pernicious  form of dualism,  with a (probably  protected and
stagnant)  formal segment with lugh labor costs and high security for workers (for a while), and
an unprotwce  small-scale sector, and high unemployment. Hence, an appropriate strategic
direr-tioil  for ovemal  spending  could be in the range of 20-30 percent-perhaps somewhat  more
for the Central  and Eastem  European  group and somewhat less for many in the FSU.
One aspect of the tax.  structure needs to be highlighted:  payroll taxes on formal (lugely
public)  sector employees  are high by international  standards;  and very high in relation to income
levels (although  comparable  to levels facing larger indusuial  enterprises in some rniddle  income
countries).  Ave:ge  payroMl  tax rates for Eastern Europe and the FSU were 40 percent  or more
in 1992  compared  with  an averagedof  25 percent  for OECD  economies  (in 1990).  This source
of money is generally the milkccow  of the pension  and employment  fa ds. It has held up
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reasonably  well in the short term, but at the cost of a high tax on labor, that could constitute  a
threat to a competitive  labor-demanding  strategy.  13
Overall,  the international  numbers  suggest  the transition  group were high public  spenders
for their income level. In the transition  there may be either a sharper dip, or the need for more
distortionary  taxation (depending  on the cost of spending  cutbacks versus the costs of raising
money). They are also unusually  high spenders, for their income level, on transfer payments,
but much less so on health and education. Transfer  payments  are rising as a share of national
resources-explicitly  in Eastern  Europe, implicity via  credit  subsidies  to enterprises  in the former
Soviet Union. Non-transfer spending-notably that related to  physical and  human capital
accumulation--risks  being squeezed  between falling taxes and high transfer demands.
How other countries  provide for  income  security. While few societies have faced the
scale of output crash of the transition group, many have faced the question  of how to provide
for transfers to the old, unemployed  and needy. How do they manage?
First, there is the OECD, and especialy  Western  European,  paradigm.  This is the classic
high transfer welfare state. Total cash transfer levels are some 11 percent of GDP for Portugal
and over 20 percent for Sweden (and 35 percent if all transfers are  included).  There is
widespread  state provision  of both (modest)  redistnbutive  transfers and (large)  social imsurance
for health, disability,  unemployment  and old age, plus to varying  degrees  family allowances  for
children  and social assistance  for the poor. Insurance-based  transfers are generally  on a pay-as-
you-go basis, mediated by the govermnent or public find. Box 1 illustrates  the situation in
Sweden  that probably  has the most developed  transfer state. What are the issues of importance
to transition economies?
- transfers are  indeed high  (as we just  saw, higher than in  most transition
economies), financed by high taxes.  But this is feasible only because of the
enormously greater productivity of these economies, because of  the  larger
physical capital stock per worker, and much more efficient functioning and
greater human capital.
- transfers have had a very large impact  on reducing  poverty, but with very large
transfers  to the non-poor:  between  a third  and 60 percent of all transfers are paid
out to the non-poor (see Mitchell 1991, p. 86).
- the OECD  economies  have indeed  grown  with high taxes and transfers, but even
these countries  are debating the appropriateness  of their comprehensive  systems
(see Box 1 on Sweden).  The issue  now is how to move forward in an
LY  A key question  is whether  the tax gets shifted to workers,  affecting  the composition  of their remuneration,  but not
labor  costs to the firn.  The more this occurs, the less the impact  on labor  demand;  but the incentive  to not pay taxes
remains.
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Box 1 - SWEDEN:  Reducing  Entidements
GDP per capita  in $PPP (1988): $14,941  (about  4 times that of Poland)
Cash social transfers (1987)  (excluding  pensions): 9.1% of GDP.
Public  health care and education  spending  (1987): 14.5% of GDP.
Inequality:  Gini coefficient  (1991)  20.
The Swedish welfare system  is, of course, the prototype of the 'cradle to grave" comprehensive  social protection.
Many countries, some of them in Eastern Europe, aspire to become "Swedens". 'Sweden'  conjures  the image of high
income level, absence  of poverty, social solidarity, full security, and low income inequality.  This was achieved by
sustained  growth of GDP and social transfers (and taxes to finance them) since the early 1930s. and particularly fast
growth in the period 1960-1983  when the share of cash transfers  and health care costs in GDP expanded from 11% to
almost  35% of GDP.
The share of social transfers in GDP and household  inoDme  is higher in Sweden  than probably  any country in the
world. Cash social transfers account for almost 40% of household  gross income against  20% in the UK and Germany
and less than 10% in the US and Canada. Transfers achieve  massivc  reduction  in income inequality. In effect, it is not
sufficiently  appreciated  that income inequality  of original (or market) income in Sweden is almost the same as in the
United States (the Gini coefficients  of about 4142)  implying  approxinately the same distribution of ownership of
physical and human capital. However.  after cash transfer Gini coefficient  in Sweden is only 24 against 37 for the US.
After deducting  personal  income  tax. Swedish inequality  drops further to 20 (probably  the lowest Gini in the world)  and
the US disposable-income  Gini becomes  32. Thus, cash transfers  and direct taxes "cut" market income inequality  in half
in Sweden.  and reduce it only by a quarter in the US.
The existence  of generous welfare  system was predicated  on high income  and relatively  fast growth resulting in low
unemployment  rates). With negative  growth in the last three years, increasing  unemployment,  and increasing  share of
the aged (18% of the population  is over 65 years of age) the system is showing  strains. For example, the current open
unemployment  is almost 8.5% of labor  force with an additional  5% of  labor force enrolled in various retaining
programs. This is almost 10% higher than the previous peak (open plus hidden)  unemployment  registered in  1978.
Relatively  expensive  active labor  market  policies (retraining,  part-time  employmcnt  in public sector, wage subsidies)  for
which Sweden  is famous are much more affordable  while overall  unemployment  is low.  [n 1987 with the rate of open
imemploynment  at 2%, Sweden  was spending  2% percent of GDP on retraining and 0.5% of GDP on unemployment
compensations. The US with an  unemployment  rate of  6%  was spending also 0.5% of  GDP on  unemployment
compensations  and on-quarter of percent of GDP on active labor market  policies. A simple extrapolation  of Swedish
numbers indicates  that with the current level of unemployment,  total cost of active and passive unemployment  policies
would exceed 10% of GDP.  This is not feasible  and in consequence  the share of resources  spent on relatively  cheaper
income maintenance  increases, while the share used for active labor market policies declines. The recent changes in
entitlements  are relatively  modest, but are indicative of the trend since it is the first time since the welfare state was
established  that the eligibility  rules had been made tighter and amounts  of transfers reduced.  The unemployment  benefit
was lowered from 90% to 30% of  the previous eamings with the first five days unpaid. The receipt of the benefit is
conditioned  on non-refusal  of "suitable'  job offers and display  of  sociable' behavior  (e.g. non-alcoholism). Retirement
age was increased  from 65 to 66 years. Sickness benefits  were reduced  from 90% to 80% of earnings  with the first day
unpaid. Health  care user fees were raised.
Source:  Based  on: Assar  Lindbeck.  Th  Swedish  EWerience.  Seminar  Papar  No.  482.  Isdalle for  Inernaional  Economic
Studies,  Stckholm  University. December 1990:  Deborah  Mitcbell,  Income Trmsfen  in Tren  Wegare Sway,
Studies  in Cash  and Care, AldershotAvebury, 1991;  Branko  Milanovic,  'Cash Social  Transfers, Direct  Taxes and
Icome Disnibution  in Late  Socialism".  Journal  of Comparative  Economncs.  1994. fordtcoming.
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increasingly  competitive  world-including how to moderate the costs of the tax-
transfer system for competitiveness  and ensure the human  capital advantages  are
maintained.
- to varying  degrees  pay-as-you-go  pensions  are in crisis  because  of the combination
of the demographic  transition  and slower than  anticipated  growth; and health care
is heading toward crisis because of steadily rising costs.
- there is growing interest (in the UK in particular) in shifting toward private
provision of insurance-type  transfers.
Second,  the  East  Asian group  achieved very  large  reductions in  poverty  and
improvements  in social indicators  primarily through  a combination  of strong  support for human
resources and a  growth strategy that emphasized openness, in products and technological
transfers. Some,  including  Korea, experienced  sustained  rapid growth  in wages  and employment
(with only small setbacks, e.g. after the second oil shock) with litle  economy-wide worker
protection. There have been use of transfer instruments (apart from the large publicly financed
social services) of two broad kinds: first, a gradual introduction  of old age and health insurnce
mechanisms,  and more recently, unemployment  insurance,  but only for the formal labor force;
second, government transfers for particular needs, including public works in  the  1980-81
recession.
Third, a number of other countries have demonstrated  how adequate coverage can be
achieved in a non-comprehensive  way, with a combination  of effective  targeting and informal
support. Chile is also in the midst of rapid takeoff, but this is in the wake of almost two decades
of up and down growth and adjustment. It made much more extensive  use of transfers targeted
by various kinds of means, including willingness  to work for public works; nutrition and health
spending have been very well targeted to the poor.  (See Box 3).  Chile also pioneered the
transformation  of a pay as you go pension system to a fully funded one. Jordan is an example
of a country that has usea selctive  transfers with some success  to provide a  safety net for the
poor.
What are the characteristics  of success in balancing  the objectives  of income promotion
and security? Korea is an undoubted leader amongst higher middle income countries; current
OECD  countries  have clearly brought (most ot) their populations  to high incomes and moderate
security, if at a much slower pace than the recent stars; Chile is now at the point of takeoff.
These experiences suggest that "growth-mediated  security" requires high priority to in-ldnd
transfers in education  and basic health (though  with rising scope for insurance  mechanisms for
health as incomes  rise); tax revenues to GDP in the 20-30 percent range; high levels of capital
accumulation;  moderate levels of cash transfers and use of clearly temporary instuments for
shielding  from recession type shocks e.g. public works schemes.
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Box  2 - EAST  ASIA:  Growth  Mediated  Security  witl Low Cash  Transfers
When it comes  to progress  in die long  haul of catching  up with  developed  capitalist  countries,  the group  of
high  perfbnming  East Asian  economies  stand  out.  Hong  Kong,  Japan,  Korea,  Singapore  and Taiwan,  China  all made
extraordinary  strides  in catching  up with  Europe  and the US in both  income  and  social  indicators.  Malaysia,  Indonesia
and  1hailand  are now  following  this  first group. Hong  Kong's  income  and life expectancy  is now  sligiitly  higher  than
the United  Kingdom's,  and Japanese  have  higher  incomes  and live longer  than Germans. Korea's  income  per head
exceeds  that  of the Czech  Republic  and  Hungary:  and  Malaysia's  exceeds  that of Bulgaria,  Poland  and Russia."  In
almost  all cases  growth  has  been  broadly  distributed,  with  a high  degree  of participation  of the poor  and  middle  classes
in development  Korea  has  been  characterized  as an example  of successful  'growth-mediated  security'.  1 5 Broad-based.
rapid  growth  was effected  by  two  characteristics  of their  development.  path: immense  expansion  in  education  and health
services  and enormous  growth  in the demand  for labor  over  time  (at  steadily  rising  skill  levels). Also  necessary  to their
success  was a strong  comnuitment  to macroeconomic  stability  (with  effective  response  to shocks),  export  push and
openness  to foreign  technology."6
The importance  of labor-demanding  growth  and investment  in skills are clear. Are there lessons  on cash
transfers  and social  security? There  are two categories  of lesson.  First, transfers  were kept low, especially  in the
periods  of rapid  growth,  facilitating  resource  allocation  to human  resource  development  and prudent  fiscal  management
(in Korea  formal  cash  transfers  were  less  than  2 percent  of GDP  in 1991). Second.  there  may  be some  lessons  from  the
approach  to cash  transfers,  though  these  are more  complex  because  of the diversity  across  countries. Also, in one
important  respect  East Asia is different:  with the exception  of Japan the countries  are young. Only  6 percent  of
Malaysians  are over  60 compared  with-20.percent  of Bulgarians-  Nevertheless,  the approach  to social  security  had  a
number  of features  that  are  of interest":
- Coverage  is relativdy  limited  and linked  to fbrmal  sector  employment.  For pensions,  coverage  is of the order of
a third  of the labor  force  in  Korea,  40.45  percent  for Malaysia  and  75 pecent for Singapore.  However,  because  of the
relative  youth  of the systems,  oDverage  of the old  is much  less:  5 percent  of the over  60s  receive  pensions  in Korea,  13
percent  in Malaysia  and 16  percent  in  Singapore.
- With  respect  to pensions,  none  has a dominant  plan  that is earnings-related,  defined  benefit  and pay-as-you-go.
Elsewhere,  notably  in Latei  America,  earnings-related  public  pillars  have  set off  the worst  pressures  for overly  generous
benefit  levels. Singapore  and Malaysia  have defined  contribution  schemes. Hong Kong  has a flat, means-tested
program,  with  a large  voluntary  private  occupational  pension  sector. Japan  has  a defined  benefit  scheme.  but it includes
both  a flat-rate  benefit  (and  payment)  and  an earnings-related  component  with  the possibility  of opting  out.  Korea  has
only recendy  sred  a schem with  a flat-rate  and earnings  relat  component-it  is flush  with  funds  for now, since
hardly  any benefits  are being paid, and it could well run into the problems  now plaguing  mature  systems  as the
population  ages.
- There  has  been  a pragmatic  use  of temporary  transfers  to smooth  shocks. For example,  Korea  used  locally  based
social  assistance  and public  works  schemes  tD  help  mitigate  the shock  of the 1980-81  recession. Malaysia  temporarily
raised  rice  subsidies  to smooth  the 198447  adjustment  period.
The  East  Asian  funds  are publicly  managed  (apart  from the  occupational  schemes),  but  East  Asian  governments  are
outliers in the prudence  of their public resource management. Even so, the retuams  to the Singapore  and Malaysia
IN4  All incomes in PPP terms.
W1  See  Drtze and Sen,  1989.
Ihi  See  World  Bank,  Thc  East Asian  Mfiracle.
XLI  Some  of this  comes  from  the background  work  to World  Bank, zcome  Secwiryfor Old  Age,  1994.
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Box 3: CIILE: Eficiency  hi Targeting
GDP  per capita  in  SPPP  (1988):  S4,71il  (equal  to  Poland's)
Cash  social  transfers  (incl.  housing  subsidies  but not  pensions):  2.5% of GDP.
Public  health  care  and  education  spending:  4.0% of GDP.
Inequality:  Gini  coefficient  (1989)  57.
Following  the 1973  coup,  real wages  in Chile  decreased  by some  30 percent.  Trade  unions  were banned  and,
when  allowed  in 1979,  severely  repressed.  Income  distribution  'worsened'  with  the  Gini  coefficient  incr asing  from
less than 50 to 57. However,  at approximately  the same time, the govemment  introduced  a  number  of social
programs  (ranging  from  public  works  to hot  meals  for  the poor  children)  whose  objective  was  to alleviate  poverty  and
reduce  social  tensions.  Chilean  approach  clearly  falls  under  the category  of residual  welfare:  while  the free market
was let to determine  incomes,  welfare  spending  were  to be directed  to the poorest  of the poor.' 6 Targeting  came  to
the forefront  of govermnent  interest,  and lots of effbrt  were expended  to devise  the "best"  programs  and -very
importantly-  to follow  up  their implementation.  Monitoring  enabled  the  authorities  to improve  the existing  programs
and  to introduce  the new  ones.  Thus  Chile  became,  somewhat  unexpectedly,  associated  with  some  of the best  practice
in the field of poverty  targeting.
Box  3. figure  1 illustrates  the  targeting  efficiency  of five  Chilean  programs.  They  are public  works,  unemployment
benefits,  school  lunches  (not  shown  in the figure),  special  family  allowances  paid  to the poorest,  and  state  pensions.
The last two are means-tested  ('means' here represents  a combination  of infonnation  on ownership  of durable,
education,  employment  etc. but not income),  school lunches  and public works rely on self-selection,  and
unemployment  benefits  are paid  to those  with  contribution  records.  The five  progms  accounted  in 1987  for almost
60 percent  of total  government  cash  transfers  (excluding  the contribtaory  pension  system)  or just over 1 percent  of
l  GDP.  The two  poorest  decile  of the population  typically  receive  between  50 and  60 percent  of the total  amount  of
each  transfer,  with  the very  poorest  decile  receiving  between  one-third  and  one-half  of total  transfers.  k is noteworthy
how  strongly  targeted  on the poorest  decile  are unemployment  benefits  and public  works:  the share of the transfer
received  falls  from  about  50 percent  for the poorest  decile  to 10  percent  for the seco=nd  poorest.  Expressed  in terms
of a synthetic  indicator  like  the concentration  coefficient,  the  efficienc,  of the five  programs  was  very  high:  for  each
program,  the concentration  coefficient  (in absolute  tenrs) is higher  than  or about  -50. CIhe  more  negative  the value,
the greater  the concentration  on the poor.'9 For comparison,  the best  targeted  programs  in the-UK  (income  support,
family  credit  and  housing  benfit) have  the concentration  coefficients  ranging  between  -45  and  -55. However,  the best
targeted  programs  in  Eastern  Europe  (child  care and  family  allowances)  have  concentrations  coefficient  between  -25
and  -30  where  the  poorest  decile  of the population  receives  less  than  one-fifth  percent  of the total  amount  of transfers
(see  Box  3, Figure  1).
1fi  This  approach  is reflected  even  in the title  of the book  from  which  most  of the calculations  presented  here  are
derived:  Effectiw social expenditures:  an instrwment  for a definitive  overcoming  of criical (sic)  povery.
121  Efficiency  is defmed  foilowing  Beckerman  (The  Impact  of Income  Maintenance  Programs  on Poverty  in Britain
1975, The  Economic  Jownal,  June  1979.  p.261)  as the reverse  of the "leakage',  i.e. of benefits  received  by the better  off
(the "non-poor).  Thus,  higher  (in absolute  amounts)  the concentration  coefficient  higher  the efficiency.
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Box  3 Figure 1. Targeting  of Social  Transfers  in Chile,  UK, and  Poland
so
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Note: Chilean data for 1987.  UK dat  for 1991.  Polish data for 1993.
Growth, securty and transfers
e have surveyed the tradeoffs between the needs for growth and restructring  and the
needs for transfers of transition societies. What does this all mean for transfer level and design?
First, there is a strongly non-linear relationship  between the two objectives of providing for
income growth and providing for income security. Figure 9 summarizes in a stylized form the
nature of the relationship that would be indicated  by the above discussion. On the vertical axis
we have put growth-say the medium-rerm  growth rate following  the mumediate  shock and decline
with the collapse of communism  and the internal Comecon  market. On the horizontal axis, we
have put "security", as a catch-all  for the avoidance  of income declines in the short run through
the use of state-mediated  transfers.  Both are deliberately  without numbers since the pattern of
tradeoffs will depend  on institutional  features of the economy, notably the extent to which taxes
can be raised without  causing  severe distortions. The stylized  line is divided into four segments:
- at low levels of security, there is a positive relation between more growth and
more security (from A to B).  In the transitional social contract some security is
conducive to  growth: to  provide at the  societal level enough assurances of
stability; to avoid a pensioner  revolt that would pull down governments; and to
provide the safety net that will facilitate firm restructuring.  And at small levels
of  transfers, adverse affects on growth are very limited.
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- at moderate levels there will be a tradeoff with growth, but this is likely to be
relatively flat (from B to C).  Probably  much of the OECD falls within this part
of the curve-societies may choose wbere they want to be along this line (e.g.
most European  countries  clearly prefer more security, if at some cost in growth),
but the tradeoff is not very steep.
- at high levels the tradeoff steepens sharply (from C  to  D)-for  the reasons
discussed above. Most transition economies  are somewhere along this segment.
- when growth collapses, security is also hit (from D to E).  This will often be
associated with attempts  to have high levels of transfer ex ante, that fail ex  post,
as in the collapse scenarios.
Second, to some extent the relationships  may shift depending  on the design of transfers.
We have emphasized  that some of the transfers  should be intrinsically  transitional, and designed
to avoid adverse incentives for economic restructuring and the labor market.  However, the
macroeconomics  of the tradeoff is largely a function of aggregate transfers levels, for which
design is relatively unimportant,  especially  in the short run.  (In the longer term, funded  pension
schemes, for example, may have more favorable savings  properties than PAYG schemes.) We
turn next to key issues  in managing the level and design of transfers.
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-lI.  MAJOR DESIGN ISES  FOR TRANSFERS:  UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURNCE;
PENSIONS;  AND  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
There  is indeed  a case for  higher  levels  of transfers  during  the transition  relative  to the long
run vision  of transfers  consistent  with  growth-for  both  poverty  and political  economy  reasons.
Supporting  consumption  of those  that may  be hurt is a good  investment,  provided  it buys the
required  policy  and  institutional  changes.  However,  this argues  for  transfers  that are an intrinsic
feature  of the transition,  and that automatically  fade away. This would  suggest  trnsfers that
facilitate  restructuring  of firms  but  not  those  that  encourage  permanent  withdrawal  from  the labor
force and long-term  entitlements.  Severance  pay or short  duration  unemployment  benefit  are
good  by this criterion,  early retirement  bad. Because  of the complex  problem  of balancing  the
creation of new jobs with the destruction  of old jobs-and the irreversible  costs of long
unemployment  spells-there  is case for designing  some  of the temporary  transfers  to make  them
conditional  on work, whether  in form of wage  subsidies  or public  works. To illustrate  what  a
significant  cut in transfers  levels  might  mean,  we undertook  a simple  quantitative  exercise  for
Bulgaria  (see  Box  4). In this section,  we then  discuss  three  of the major  categories  of transfers,
relating  to unemployment  (and  employment),  pensions  and social  assistance.
Unemployment  Insurance and Temporary  Employment-Related  Assistance.
Most  transition  countries  have  introduced  unemployment  insurance,  with  benefits  for  workers
who lost their jobs for a limited  duration  (usually  up to a year), combined  with severance
payment  obligations  of enterprises. These  are quite  appropriate  to the transitional  labor  market
shocks.
Question:  Should  unemployment  benefits  be earnings-related  or equal  for all?
General  practice  so far has been  to have  earnings-related  unemployment  benefits. This is
also  the practice  in Western  Europe  and the USA.  However,  it may be useful to consider  the
alternative  of flat-rate  unemployment  benefits  (as  introduced  in Poland  and Estonia),  combined
with  a modest  supplemental  earnings-related  severance  payment  upon  unemployment,  at a level
not inhibiting  initial  hiring (equivalent  to, say, 3 months  income).  The rationale  for earnings-
related  unemployment  benefits  is that they are indeed  insurance  premia-paid out of earnings-
rated  individual  contributions.  Thus if contributions  are unequal,  it is only  fair that the benefits
be unequal.  This rationale,  however,  does  not hold in transition  economies  because  there was
no unemployment  insurance  prior to transition-no  one paid  anything  toward  that.  Furthermore,
because  of the sudden  and massive  character  of unemployment,  unemployment  benefits  have
more  in common  with  temporary  welfare  payments  to a specific  set of individuals  (one  can  think
of them  as categorical  social  assistance)  than  with  unemployment  insurance  in its strict sense.
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Box 4.  AN EXAMPLE  OF ALTERNATIVE  AWsFER  LEVES-BuLGARIUA  I  TIE  MID-1990S
In Bulgaria,  transfers  already  accounted  for over 12 percent  of GDP  in 1992,  with  pensions  by far the
largest  component,  at 9 percent  of GDP.  Bulgaria  has an old age dependency  ratio comparable  to
Belgium's,  yet it also has a retirement  age of 55 for women  and 60 for men (with special  earlier
retirement  for selected  occupations.)  Fiscal  pressures  are immense:  despite  a revenue  ratio  of the order
of 50 percent  of GDP  and  sharp  falls  in government  wages.  The  social  security  and  unemployment  funds
have not yet gone into  deficit,  but only with a payroll  tax rate of 49 percent. This source  is under
pressure  owing  to a rapid  decline  in its base:  the share of public  wage  employment  in the total labor
force  has dropped  from around  95 percent  to 60 percent  by 1993,  and there are few collections  from
small  private  finns.
We constructed  two scenarios,  illustrated  in Box 4, Table 1 that  represent  potential  outcomes  in the mid-
1990s. For both we divide the population  into children (below  15), potentially  working age (15-65)  and
old (over 65).  In the first, we take the 1992/93  position  as the base and assume that there is no change
in the share of transfer  recipients  from each group, including  no change  in the age of retirement. We do
assume a continuing fall in the share of the fonnal sector (tax-paying) in employment, to about 50
percent. The result is a share of transfers to GDP of about  13.5 percent of GDP and contributions  of
almost 9 percent of GDP.
For the second scenario, we aimed to cut back transfers in a manier that most protected the poor.  We
were guided in part by evidence  on  the distributional  incidence  of different transfers from the 1992
household  expenditure  survey. This found pensions  to be by far the most equitable transfer instrument
(especially  for the over-65s), child allowances  mildly disequalizing,  and unemployment  benefit  having
the same impact as the underlying  wage income.  We then explored  the implications  of cutting child
allowances  to 50 percent of children (e.g. through some rough means-testing),  reduced eligibility  of the
under-65s  (through  rapid rises in the retirement  age), and reducing  replacement  ratios on all transfers  (to
the average wage) by about a quarter.  We then increased  the social assistance  program by about 2
times-this could be used for public works schemes at low wages, for example.  Finally we cut payroll
taxes in half, but assumed  that at the much lower rate the share of formal wage employment  would
recover to  some 75 percent of the labor force.-9"  These measures  cut total transfers to 8-9 percent of
GDP and payroil taxes to slightly  below 7 percent of GDP.
This can be viewed as an exercise  of what could be feasible  over a period of a few years, assuming  that
some gains could be achieved  from raising the retirement age, but without  withdrawing  pensions  from
those already retired but below 65.  Over a period of 5-10 years, raising the retirement age to 65 for
both men and women, would reduce the number of below-65's receiving  old age pensions to close to
zero, and total transfers to some 7 percent of GDP.
2W1  Two  effects  could  operate:  more  firms  choosing  to be within  the  tax net;  and,  if payroll  taxes  affect  labor  costs  to
the firm (theoretically  an open question),  higher labor demand  in the fonnal sector.
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Box  4. Table  1.  Transfer  levels  under alterative assumpdons
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Other  6  37  1.2  6  30  .9
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6smdoe  5  is  1o0  37  4£8  100  30  3.3
Social  0.4  _  . 1.0
Total  13U4  1.7
Payrol  tax  rate  49  25
Share  of wage  eMploymet  in labor  fce  50  75
Tax  receipts  5s  6.7
Net  incling  4.6  2i
Eligibility for unemployment  compensation  should be quite restrictive, for example,
excluding  school leavers and requiring extended  previous employment.
Qutnn:  Who should bear the cost of severance pay?
Severance  payments  are generally  obligations  of enterprises. This has some advantages.
If the govemment  is always expected to pay, moral hazard problems  may emerge: enterprises
may either recldessly or intentionally  hire and fire workers in order to collect (or split with
workers) the severance payments. Government obligations  could be  confined to  cases of
enterprise liquidation and as financier of last resort; and that limited role may even prove
infeasible  where  economies  are heading  toward  fiscal collapse.  The option  of receiving  severance
and unemployment  insurance payments in a lump-sum  fashion should be encouraged so as to
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increase the probability that some of the otherwise unemployed will enter and succeed in self-
employment, for example,  in the expanding services and trade sectors.  There is thus a trade-off
even with severance pay. Its positive feature  is that it provides the unemployed  with a sum of
money they would be unlikely to have saved otherwise and opens the possibility of starting  a
small business.  Its disadvantage is,  when paid by the state, the moral hazard  issue, and when
paid by enterprises,  its deterrence  to hiring  (if the worker turns out to be redundant  later,  the
cost of lay-off is increased,  and firms may try to avoid this by simply hiring fewer people).
Question Are there chances for the unemployed to start their own businesses?
It is still too early to say how common are such opportunities. It depends on the country
(how easy  or  difficult  it  is to  start  a  small  business)  as  well  as  on  characteristics  of  the
unemployed (a semi-skilled steel worker  in his SOs  is less likely to go into small business  han
a  thirty-year  old  computer  programmer).  Preliminary  evidence  indicates that  there  are job
opportunities available in the private informal sector.  Many are being tapped already as a source
of secondary income, including by the unemployed.  But small business creation, while it can
alleviate the unemployment problem,  is unlikely to represent a full solution. Greater demand for
labor and retraining are more realistic options.
Quectionu  But since greater labor demand and retraining either take time or are very expensive,
what else should be done in the short run?
In recognition of the particularly  insecure situation facing workers in the next couple of
years  (when massive  enterprise  privatization  and  restructuning gets  underway  and until  the
emerging private sector invests heavily), special but temporary measures are entirely appropriate;
unemployment compensation and/or  severance  packages may not be  enough.  Particularly  in
hard-hit regions and one-company towns, one should encourage experimentation in a variety of
programs to see what works best under different circumstances.  Experimentation could include
temporary employment programs,  either  public works schemes paying below market  wage or
wage subsidy programs (marginal employment subsidies for new hires by the privawe  sector from
the  pool  of unemployed).  In  Spain,  for  example,  workers  were  given  a  menu  of  options,
including whether to take severance payment or carry a wage subsidy to prospective employers.
Evidence from Poland  and elsewhere  indicates that employers demand better  skilled workers
under wage subsidy programs (so that the low-skilled long-term unemployed are o'tbn not picked
up) but also-on  the positive side-that  the likelihood of finding the "real" job  is greater  than
with public works.  There may well be a prima facie  case for experimenting  witt. discretionary
programs  of transitional  protection  of employment  in isolated  depressed  regions  (e.g.,  one-
industry towns) in the non-negative value added activities.  The focus would be on overcoming
resistance  to enterprise  and farm  restructuring  through  use of temporary  measures,  avoiding
putting in place welfare mechanisms  extending beyond the immediate transitional period.
Question  What could be the role of public works?
Public works schemes may be targeted to the residual long-term unemployed.  They are
an effective option to prevent poverty and slow-down skill obsolescence.  A difficulty with such
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programs is that the ability to self-target via the wage, which is one of the main advantages of
public works as it economizes on the scarce administrative capacity of the state,21'  is limited in
those countries where many workers are already bunched around a low market wage.  This
indicates that such  programs are  likely to  be more successful in  isolated pockets of  high
unemployment among lower educated workers. This reinforces the point that experimentation,
including the role played by the public works, should be decentralized.
To  maximize collateral  effects  and  avoid  the  selection of  inefficient infrastructure
supported under tlt.  program, the programs would need to be limited to clear cases of public
underinvestment such as enviromnental clean-up.  Simple public works (such as roads and
irrigation) are also likely to be more appropriate in rural areas than in urban areas.
Question:  Wouldn't  these programs crowd-out private labor demand? What is the tradeoffs
between the possibility of crowding out and letting more people be unemployed for longer time
than necessary?
There is indeed the potential that public "job creation  programs simply substitute for jobs
that would be anyway created by private and public enterprises. Evidence from Poland indicates,
however,  that participation in both  public works and temporary wage subsidy programs  is
negatively correlated with the level of demand in a  locality, supporting the view that these
programs  do not crowd out other employment and would naturaUy decline as labor demand
recovers.  This evidence also reduces the concern that the wage subsidy would be paid for
employment that would have been given anyway. The alternative of not having such a program
risks higher and longer unemployment, combined with faster skill obsolescence (than if people
do some work) and growing discouragement and frustration. All of these are socially costly
effects.
Question.  What role does training play!
The  problem in  the transition  is primarily  lack of  aggregate labor demand.  Such
employment-related  programs are designed to make up for temporarily insufficient labor demand,
as the process  of resource reallocation to  the prvate  sector  takes time.  It is  important to
recognize that in that context taining  may merely displace one worker for another.  There is
indeed a  shortage of market-oriented skills, e.g.,  in accounting, banling,  diverse services.
However,  private  returns  for such  market-oriented skills appear  to be  sufficiently high  to
encourage private sector provision.  It is less likely that the long-term unemployed will have the
background to compete for such training.  Evidence from Poland indicates that the long-term
unemployed are largely young low-skilled workers or older people, often older women, with low
educational attainment and with low or narrow skills.  Such groups would need to be assisted
through efforts to raise basic human capital in combination with psychological and vocational
counseling to address issues such as low morale.
Wlf  See Dreze and Sen (1989, pp. 113 ft).
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Qtstiolin  Isn't  housing the  most serious  constraint to  mobility and,  hence,  employment
opportunities?
Mobility is one of the most important constraints to employment in the transition period,
and, in this regard, housing is a major constraint. The employment-related  programs would need
to be complemented with an urgent reform of housing policy to encourage both the release of
the existing housing stock onto the market and the completion of new units.
Pensions
Pensions are both a central and difficult area for reform.  They are central for two
reasons: the sheer size of pensions in total transfers (if total transfers are unaffordable, something
has to be done about pensions); and the longevity of this form of transfer.  Throughout the world
pension "entitlements" do get lost or eroded,  =' but  it is obviously implausible to  think of
pensions as a transitional feature of the next few years!  They are difficult because of the nature
of the tradeoffs.  Given the need to lower the claim of public pensions on current and future
economy-wide resources (both benefits and contributions), how can governments substantially
pare down the inherited publicly-funded PAYG pension schemes?  At the same time, how can
the economy provide for older groups who have worked all their lives and formed expectations
with regard to their pensions?
The process and dilemmas are likely to be different for the economies already wrecked
by inflation or heading toward collapse and those headed toward sclerosis. In many of the FSU
countries, notably the Baltics and Russia,  and in  Bulgaria in  the Eastem European group,
reducing entitlements  under the previous system has already largely been done through inflation
whittling down-in  some cases excessively-the  level of real benefits.  Replacement rates are
closer to 30-40 percent and there have been large real declines in pensions.  For the collapse
economies such as Ukraine the inability to pay benefits has resulted in disprotection and non-
fulfillment of previous social contracts, such as arrears in paying benefits at the same time that
near hyperinflation is reducing the value of those benefits.  In both cases entitlements by and
large are being eroded in an unplanned and ad hoc manner.  The full extent of the problem
remains for the lower inflation countries and those where indexing has become the practice such
as Poland-those  where transfer systems are continuing, pensions represent a sizeable share of
GDP, and sclerosis may be setting in.
It  is useful to distinguish between the pension system for existing and soon-to-retire
pensioners, and younger workers.  Long-term reforms for future retirees is essential, since this
will affect the behavior of wage-earners now and the income position of both the government and
221 See World Band, Income Security  for Old Age, 1994. for docunentation of erosion of seemingly  government-
guaranteed entidemnents.
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pensioners for decades to come.  We come to those tradeoffs below.  But decisions on refonns
for existing or near retirees are key for the short run: whatever the nature of long-run reform
over the next five to ten years, there are important tradeoffs in assessing the savings that can
come only from reforms within the existing public system. The approach to pension reform
raises  some  contentious  issues,  particularly  for  the  older  cohorts,  but  also  for  younger
generations.
More important, the failure to address those contentious issues squarely can have grave
consequences.  An unstrategic and ad hoc response to the pressures of fiscally unsustainable
pension schemes  tends  to  hit precisely  the  groups most in  need of  protection during  the
ransition.  One of the strategic objectives is that categorical programs such as pensions play a
role in transferring income to otherwise poor households.  In the face of high inflation, benefits
levels are reduced by the same proportion for all pension income groups, (in fact, after taking
into account increasing nominal transactions costs of picking up  a pension check, levels are
reduced more for those receiving the minimum pension).  Similarly, in the case of arrears, all
pension income groups are affected in the same way.  Those households which rely solely on
pension income are being pushed into a desperate situation and are disproportionately affected
by the lack of a strategy for a sustainable pension program.  Also, a failure to deal with the
provision of benefits or to restrict eligibility means that in an ad hoc manner there  are  less
pension fund resources for adequately funding the minimum pension levels or for providing
pensions to those-generally  older-pvnsioners  without alternative sources of income.
Given the potentially grave consequences of failing to face the tradeoffs squarely, we now
tum to the contentious short-run issues which need to be addressed, focusing first on the question
of eligibility and retirement age and ten  to the question of entitlements and benefit levels.
Restricting eligibility.  A significant increase in the retirement age (say to 65 with gender
equality)  and  elimination  of  most  early  retirement  schemes  is  the  critical  step  for  the
sustainability of the public PAYG system for the medium-term. This is already under discussion
in most countries (e.g. the Bulgaria white paper recommends gradually raising retirement to 63
for both men and women; Slovenia and Estonia already raised the retirement age).
Qlstiozr  How fast and far can eligibility be restricted?  What are the tradeoffs?
The faster and further the retirement age can be increased, the more room for manoeuvre
there is for maintaining the real value of pensions.  It is also desirable from a labor market
viewpoint, except from a very myopic perspective.  Reducing the size of the labor force is bad,
not good, for growthWY.  It reduces contributors to social insurance schemes, when this takes the
form  of  payroll  taxes,  as  well  as  raising  outflows  to  pensioners.  It  is  also  bad  for
macroeconomic management to the extent there is 2 tradeoff between inflation and labor market
Dl Of course, to fte exten pensioners  remain in te  labor force-as  mnany  do, in the informal sector-there  is not an
economic loss, only a double fiscal burden, through the increased transfer and the reduced contribution.
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pressures. (See below for the question of competition between the young and old for jobs.)  The
problem with raising the retirement age quickly is that the previously near-retirees would have
little chance to adjust to a situation where retirement would be delayed and that the inequity
between those who just retired and those who were soon to retire would be sharp.  In view of
this, several countries in the region have adopted a more gradual formula, eg, increasing the
retirement age by 6 months every year, but that means more adjustnent having to come from
elsewhere.
Question:  What to do about early retirement?
Early  retirement  is  an  expensive option  relative  to  other  measures  of  supporting
restructuring, including severance payments for the unemployed discussed below.  To the extent
support to  unproductive workers  is required  in the  transition,  it is  much better  if  this is
temporary.  For example, wage subsidies are a less costly option than early retirement because
the affected workers eventually return to full-paying  jobs at a later stage as conditions improve
(and wage subsidies are generally lower than the cost of a pension while they are used).
ustion:  If retirement age is raised would young people have more problems finding jobs?
In general, inexperienced new entrants to the labor force are not close substitates for
experienced  ones.  Evidence  from  transition  economies  indicates  that  levels  of  youth
unemployment relative to unemployment of older workers are comparable to those of non-
transition economies.  At the same time, there may be a number of older workers who are
without the technologies and skills required to be absorbed into the emerging labor markets and
who are not easily retrainable. Unless the young have opportunities for education and training,
the old workers could well compete with the young for the low-skilled jobs.  This strengthens
the need to refocus expenditures on human capital development to avoid such a problem.  The
much-admired German system indeed has strong links between education and training and the
transition to work.  But another feature is that it allows companies to pay lower effective wages
for young workers, in exchange for the lack of experience and trainingYJ  It makes sense to
relax minimum wage rules for the young.  Other pro-labor elements,,such as  lower labor
taxation, also will increase aggregate labor demand and so offset competition between older and
younger workers.
Confronting  benefit levels and replacement ratios.  In any case, it is unlikely that raising
the retirement age wilL  be sufficient for an immediate impact.  To have a significant impact on
spending it would have to be combined with reduced replacement ratios (and even more reduced
real levels) relative to inherited entitlements.  Where there have already been real reductions
through inflation, as in the Baltics, the issue is one of holding on to the adjustment that has
ZN/  Sec  Heclman. Rosdius and  Smidi. US  F&cadon and Traoiang  Policy: a Reevauaaion  of the Underlying  Assunptions
behin  the New consensur.
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occurred.  These changes would then allow significant reductions in contribution rates or tax
allocations (see below for the issue of payroll taxation).  If pension contributions are designed
to be of the order of 20 percent of payroll with  benefits targeted at 30-40 percent of average
wages,  this would represent  4-6 percent of  GDP  for a country  with a  moderately mature
population such as Bulgaria or Poland, or somewhat less for a country with a relatively young
population such as Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan.2  After an initial adjustment, there should be
some form of indexing, preferably linking pensions partially to changes in consumer prices (to
give the guarantee of  some real protection) and partially to average wage developments (so
pensioners share in economy-wide losses and gains).
Qustion:  How to ensure intergenerational equity between the current young and the current old?
The old and young have conflicting interests. The old have an interest in maximizing their
share of the (currently declining) cake; pensioners worked all their lives under socialism and may
reap few of the benefits of a capitalist future.  Pensioners also tend to be big on voting.  The
young, on the other hand, have an interest in investing in their future wages, via education and
through fast transition to a development path consistent with rising labor productivity.
Which way income transfers between generations goes depends a lot on how quickly and
how strong the recovery is.  If pensioners are relatively protected (as in Poland, for example)
and especially if this also slows the pace of transition and recovery,  then present and future
workers are going to be transferring income to current retirees.  If pensioners take a large hit,
as  in the  Baltics, and the  economy bounces back, but pensions stay low,  then the transfer
implicitly goes the other way.  Even in the latter case, it is highly likely that the current groups
of workers will have to both start building savings for their retirement (e.g. via fimded schemes)
and finance transfers to the old.
This is an issue of balance, that will vary from country to country.  But in all a simple
principle is likely to make sense: that pensioners should share some of the aggregate income
decline that is occurring in the transition, and should also share some of future wage growth via
the partial linking of pensions to avenge  wages.
Ouestion: Aren't the old pensioners now generally in a less favorable position  han the young?
The old are more likely to be both relatively poor (especially when pensions are linked
to previous wages without an adequate inflation adjustment!)  and relatively ill-equipped to work.
But for pensioners in their 50s and early 60s, the scope for returming  to work is both higher and
already occurring.  (In many countries of the former Soviet Union some 15-20 percent of
pensioners work.) But if anytbing, pension schemes are discriminating against older pensioners.
25/  In the Bulgaria case (Box 4. Table 1), a 30 percent replacement ratio  leads  to a pensions of slightly above 3 percent  of
GDP  for the over-65s, but Bulgaria's wages arc only 80 percent of per capita GDP.  We also expect there to be some
pensions for the belcw-65s  in the short to medium term.
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To the extent earnings-related components of benefits are linked to nominal values and in the
face of inflation, the earnings-related base is far lower for older pensioners than for younger
pensioners.  Early retirees among pensioners are being favorably treated in an actuarially unfair
manner given that benefit levels in most countries are not related to contributions, and sometimes
not even to years of contribution.  Introducing a link between benefits and years of contribution
could go some way in redressing that actuarial inequity as well as encourage near-retirees to stay
on the job longer and enhance their labor force contribution.
Questions  What are the tradeoffs between flat-rate and earning-related benefits?
Flat-rate pensions are attractive from an administrative  perspective.  They are also most
likely  to  encourage those  with higher  capabilities to  stay  in  the  labor  force  (formally or
informally). However, some differentiation is probably a necessity to preserve social cohesion--
and avoid pensioners voting reformist governments out of office. In most countries some version
of the formula: pensions = flatrate component  +  b* past earmings,  (where b is a fraction) will
be appropriate.  However, the value of b has to be quite low for overall affordability.
An additional way of compensating existing pensioners for lower and more compressed
incomes could be through participation in the distribution of wealth-the  wealth that they did
indeed help create in their working lives.  This is happening already with respect to housing in
some cases (in Bulgaria most housing was in effect given away to incumbents, with the old
disproportionately represented).  Consideration could also be given to preferred allocations of
shares in privatized enterprises.  This wiLl  depend on the form of the privatization scheme, and
there may be competing uses for this source from future retirees: e.g.  in Latvia there are plans
to  use part  of  the  shares  of  privatized companies to  contribute to  a  funded pension plan
(something of potential importance to middle-aged  workers who will not have much time to build
up savings for their future pensions via a funded scheme). In Moldova vouchers are being given
in relation to years of work.
Questkn:  What is the tradeoff  between cutting back on pension schemes and creation of a
poverty group of pensioners, thereby exacerbating poverty in transition economies?
Evidence in many countries indicates that pensioners now are not disproportionately
amongst the poor,  though the  situation is  very different in  Poland, where  they have been
relatively protected and are half as likely to be poor as other groups in the population, and in
Russia or Bulgaria, where they have been relatively hard hit.  Even in Russia, recent results
suggest that pensioners are,  if anything, slightly underrepresented amongst the poor.2'  As
already noted, many pensioners continue to work, especially in the 50-65 years cohort; some
even in the same job.  While it is true that pensioners over 65 years may have little opportunity
to enhance their income through jobs, many pensioners of both cohorts have access to housing,
Wi/ Preliminary  results  from a probit  analysis  oF  poverty  in Russia  by Mark  Foley from ihe 1993 RSLMS
'Dcterminants  of  household  income  level and  poverty  profile  for Russia".
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providing in-ldnd income for their households, although  there continue to be problems converting
this wealth into income.  In addition to maintaining a basic pension for all as a safety net for
pensioners, public spending on basic health services will be of especially importance for the old.
:UCjgn:  Is there a tradeoff in terms of reneging on benefit entitlements, jeopardizing the
credibility of the remaining contributory scheme and, hence, increasing evasion?
To remain credible and maintain intergenerational cohesion, the younger generation
should maintain some flow to older generations. But it should be made clear that the system was
not going to be economically able to provide the promised high benefit levels for so many post-
retirement years.  The tramsitional  PAYG system would be expected to gradually shift to a first
pillar, in principle redistributive and general revenue-financed. Additional pillars would have
the characteristic of stronger linkages between contributions and future benefits.  The credibility
of such schemes will have to be earned over time.  However, this is not a good reason to
maintain unaffordable benefit levels now: since these require large and rising payroll tax rates
on an already declining tax base, these are as likely to raise as reduce tax evasion.
Qucson:  With the earnings-related component significantly reduced, how will pensions help
the labor force achieve its objective of smoothing income over the lifetime?
Some differentiation of pensions is probably desirable on political grounds for existing
and soon-to-retire pensioners, but significantly more compressed than the wage structure.  For
current workers there is certainly a need for schemes to smooth income, but these should as far
as possible be linked to individual contributions.  As discussed above, this could be through
mandated  funded  schemes,  company  or  individual  based  private  savings  schemes,  or
contribution-related public schemes.
So what of longer-term reforms? As pressure grows to reinstate those entitlements once
the economy stabilizes, as in the Baltics, more permanent arrangements will need to be made to
sustain some realization of the gains from the squeeze on previous entitlements and the increase
in retirement age. Possibly, the nature of longer-term  reforms also can reinforce the willingness
of workers to confront the other tradeoffs associated with the current PAYG system.  The twin
objectives of providing a safety net for the poor and consumption-smoothing  for the non-poor
is probably best served by a system with more than one 'pillar".  '  Any system should have at
least a modest public PAYG pillar with a significant redistributive component to meet minimum
income objectives.  This would then have to be complemented  by mechanisms to provide for
higher pensions for the non-poor via earnings and contnbution-related mechanisms. There are
arious ways in which this can be done: through use of individual accounts in a public scheme,
through  a  mandated  privately-managed  fully-funded  or  through  the  encouragement  of
occupational-related schemes.  There are good general arguments for having funded, privately
managed schemes forming part of the long-rmn  package, but the choice over this, its design and
27  See World Bank. Income Securwiyfor  Old Age,  1994. for a full discussion  of issues in pension reform.
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timing  will often be  country-specific.  Three  considerations  will often  apply.  First,  the  more
expected benefits  are linked to contributions  the less are the incentives  to evade (that is key for
public finance) and adjust labor demand  or supply (that is key for growti  and employment)-this
clearly  favors  funded  schemes.  Second,  however,  while  funded  schemes  have  attractive
properties,  it  may  be  tough  to  mandate  significant  contributions  in  the  early  phase  of  the
transition  when  incomes  are  declining  or  stagnant  (not  least  because  workers  will  still  be
financing  existing  retirees).  There  may also  be limitations  on introducing  privately  managed
funded  schemes  where  capital  markets  are  weakc.  Third,  it  is important  that  occupational
schemes operate  within a well-developed  regulatory  framework  to protect  workers  from fature
collapses,  and protect  governments  from defacto  entitlements--and with requirements  on funding
and  (preferably)  vesting and portability,  it is unlikely that they will make  a major  contribution
to pensions  in the short run.
Social Assistance
One of the policy  areas with significant  trade-offs is the design  of social assistance  with
the objective of alleviating  poverty.  How can a program avoid covering  too many households,
with negative fiscal  consequences  combined  with negative labor market  effects?  At the same
tine,  how  can  a  program  mininize  the  risk  of  failing  to  reach  the  poor  with  truly  no
alternatives?  At  one  extreme  a comprehensive  program  of means-tested  monetary  assistance
aimed at guaranteeing  a minimum  income  runs the risk of covering  too  many households.  An
alternative  approach  emphasizes  the  role  of  households  and  the  community  in  preventing
households  from  falling  into poverty,  with the state narrowly  targeting  its assistance.
Question:  What  are the tradeoffs  with  respect  to the labor market?
As graphically  pointed out in the discussion  of choices and tradeoffs  in section II, public
transfer  schemes  generally,  and guaranteed  income programs  particularly,  can substitute  for a
whole range of mechanisms  to cope with adverse shocks, such as loss of a job.  In many of the
countries of eastern  Europe and the former Soviet Union where minimum wages have fallen and
where  the  resulting  gap  with  the  subsistence  minimum  is  quite  small,  guaranteed  income
programs  provide  a  strong  incentive  not  to  search  for  work  and  engage  in  other  income-
generating activities.  Other coping mechanisms  are likely to be used extensively by households.
For example, according  to survey data from the Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria and Russia,
the majority of households  grow some of their own food, engage  in do-it-yourself  activities  and
exchange services with friends  and relatives. 2 '  A comprehensive  program  runs the risk of, for
example, transferring  income to a house uold with able workers  in their thirties.  Where further
support  is required  is in removing  the  impediments  to  some  of these  activities,  for example,
2I1  See Richard  Rose. 'Divisions and Contradictions in Economies in Transition: Household Portfolios  in Russia, Bulgaria
and Czechoslovakia'. August 1992. At the same time, it should be recognized  that being unemployed may result in loss of
altemative  uncivil sources of income, for example, the inability to receive  bribes or provide special favors  in canying out
official  jobs, also cited in the paper.
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giving some of the complementary assets of the enterprises, such as farm plots, to the formally
unemployed households.
Question:  What are the administrative tradeoffs?
Another risk of means-tested social assistance is that  of covering households whose
incomes are higher than reported. In transition economies  informal sector income is widespread
and cannot be monitored.  Households with such income may end up receiving social assistance
for which they should not qualify. Developing a more reliable monitoring capability is extremely
costly: hundreds of thousands of  individual circumstances will have to be assessed. In addition,
social workers could be swamped by claimants and the need to check every one of them would
detract from the equally important qualitative inputs (counselling, help with finding the right
kindergarten for children, dealing with alcoholism in the family etc.)  Also, administering  means-
or income-tested systems has proven to be feasible only in countries where personal income tax
systems are well-developed, which is not the case in most of the transition economies.  Some of
these problems, however, can be minimized by using asset testing, which is being piloted in a
number of countries.
Question: What are the tradeoffs between social assistance and other non-government channels
of support?
Another risk  is that government income transfers will substitute for inter-household
transfers, and, on a temporary basis, using financial  savings or other assets.  Household financial
savings throughout the  former  Soviet Union have been reduced  to  insignificance via  high
inflation.  However, many households have assets in the form of housing, and efforts should
focus on 1-moving impediments  to making these liquid through, for example, clarification of the
legal framework for rental, leasing and sales.  The shortage economy associated with the former
socialist state also provided households with opportunities to develop informal interhousehold
networks and mechanisms for coping with adversity, albeit with barter transactions of a very
different nature and origin  an  under present circumstances. Recent evidence from Poland
indicates that private transfers will substitute in part for government transfers. It is important for
the medium-term strategy to recognize the tradeoff of means-tested social assistance programs
in terms of discouraging the development of non-governmental  charitable organizations and other
channels for assisting households that may develop in the future.
Qustion:  What are the tradeoffs between cash social assistance and access to critical social
services?
Access to key social services is vital, in the transition and beyond.  Excessive attention
to comprehensive income support programs may lead to the crowding out of social services
(vaccination, schooling, running water, sewage system). Enhancing the resource base of poorer
regions, including fiscal federalism considerations, would play an important role in strengthening
their ability to protect such services.
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QuestiQn:  What are the tradeoffs between a more narrow approach to social assistance and
possible failure to reach poor households?
A more narrow program  is, of course, less costly and less distortionary (in terms of
incentives). It is also easier to administratively imnplement.  However, it would, by definition,
reach  fewer  people than a  more  comprehensive program.  Experience with comprehensive
programs in developed countries indicates that means-testing fails to reach sizeable proportion
of the poor, and that the "leakage" to the non-poor is high (between  40 and 60 percent of total
spending is paid to the non-poor). The former risk is greater under the "narrow" approach, but
the latter is less.  Also, many otherwise vulnerable households would be covered by various
categorical schemes or,  in severely depressed regions, by temporary employment-assistance
programs outlined above. Public works in Chile employed, at their peak, about 13 percent of the
labor force.  Social assistance would be targeted to those who have both low income and are
unable to improve their standard of living through their own efforts (such as the handicapped),
with discretion given to local offices on the extent of income gap filling and emphasis placed on
social counselling and in-kind assistance to reverse or target the dysfunction if at all possible.
For example, in Ukraine, the government has introduced a social assistance program  for the
elderly living alone without family support, including rural women.  Throughout Russia, local
social assistance offices have developed some well-targeted  programs despite tightly constrained
resources.  An increase in resources to local social assistance efforts would minimize the risk
of failing to reach those households unable to help themselves.
Question:  Should consumer subsidies be used for social assistance objectives?
While  massive  and  untargeted  subsidies prevailing until  recently  in  the  transition
economies  clearly contradict a transition to a market economy, selected use of subsidies may be
appropriate.  In conditions of very high inflation, the automatic indexing inherent in assistance
in kind, such as food coupons, is an advantage. In-kind transfers can be appropriate to influence
the intrahousehold allocation of resources, such as school feeding programs. Some essential
foodstuffs may indeed need to be subsidized for a transition period.  Efforts would need to be
made to identify inferior goods to facilitate self-targeting and contain fiscal impact. If bread or
milk are undifferentiated currently, consideration should  be given to introducing inferior goods,
for example, through coarse grain or low-quality packaging.  This should be done particularly
in poorer --Central Asian and Balkan-  countries. (See Box 5 for an example from Jordan).
Housing or utility costs can be covered in part by local offices for those who qualify (have low
income and dysfunctionality) as part of assistance in kind, with experimentation in targeted
voucher programs.  In all cases, the level of the subsidy would have to remain modest to avoid
significant distortionary impacts on consumption, such as use of bread as animal feed.  Hence,
there may be a role for targeted consumer subsidies.
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Family allowances  can also  be regarded  as part of social  assistance.  This  is particularly
the case since during  the transition  larger  families  were disproportionately  affected  by poverty
(Figure  10 illustrates the impact on the example of Poland).  However,  family allowances  are still
not  a  well-targeted  tool  to  combat  poverty.  Lots  of money  "leaks"  to  the  families  that  are
relatively  well-off.
Qustion:  How can payments  of family allowances paid to well-off people who don't  need them
be limited?
Several (not-mutually  exclusive)  options to reduce the leakage may be envisaged:  (a) simple
income-testing  of family alowances  at relatively high level of average wage (for example,  where
one  of the  members  has  a  wage  three  times  in  excess  of the  average)  so  that  the  error  of
exclusion  be  minimized,22' (b)  increasing  family  allowance  as  mnmber of children  rises  since
poverty  rates increase  with family  size,  (c) increasing  family  allowances  for some  categories  of
households,  e.g.  single mothers  as was recently  implemented  in Russia.
ftstion:  Should family  allowances  be  taxed?
They  should  be  treated  like  any  other  type  of  income  so as to  further  reduce  leakage  to
higher  income households  that are generally  being taxed at higher  marginal  rates.  Existence  of
family  allowances,  whether  universal  or  income-tested,  combined  with  their  taxation  is much
more progressive  than tax deduction  or tax credits  on account  of children.
Question:  Can  family allowances  be harnessed  to achieve some  added objectives?.
For  example,  family  allowances  can  be  made  conditional  on  performed  vaccination  of
children.  This approach  was used  in  Chile with  notable  success.  However  one need not worry
that they may send the wrong  signal,  namely that it matters  more to have more children  hn  to
work  hard.  Such  worries  are  displaced  for  two  reasons:  family  allowances  as  proposed  here
would be a much smaller proportion  of wage than they were in the socialist past (say 4-5 percent
of average  industrial wage instead of 8-10 percent)  and wage differentiation  that goes on hand-in-
hand  with  transition  to market  economy  will further  erode  importance  of  family  allowance  in
relation  to wage for many  middle-  and better-paid  households-
22! It is preferable to have wage than  income test because it is much simpler. One of the main reasons not to support aft
incometested  social assistance  system is precisely difficulty in ascertaining incomes.
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Figure  10
Poverty  rates for households
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Question: How would  the collapse of child care provision  by enterprises  be addressed?
One  possibility  would  be the introduction  of vouchers  to be used to defray the costs of child
care, both private and state-provided.  The vouchers  would be either paid to all recipients  of
fmily  allowances  or to all poor families  (if family  allowance  is not income  tested) whose  child
is between  the ages of, say, 2 and 6, or only to working  mothers  with "low  incomes"  (to reduce
"cost" of  joining  the labor force). Work-test  may be necessary  to avoid the danger of a poverty
trap: without  a work-test,  people  whose  wage  is just above  the poverty  line may be better off if
they "remain poor" and collect welfare payment plus the voucher than if they work-thus  losing
both social assistance  and the child-care  voucher.
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CONCLUSION
Transition  societies  face acute conflicts. The old days were characterized  by stagnant
incomes, rationed goods and lack of liberties, but they did have a high degree of income
security. The early days of reform  have  brought  civil liberties,  lots of goods, crashing  incomes
and rising insecurity. Most countries are set on a course to some form of capitalism.  This
intrinsically  involves  greater  risk-taking  and less security--and  almost  certainly  greater  inequality
in the primary  distribution  of incomes.
Should transition societies use transfers to substitute  for this rise in insecurity and
poverty?  The short-run  crash in incomes,  the heritage  of cradle-to-grave  state  protection  and the
vision  of the West European  welfare  state  all provide  compelling  motivation  for widespread  use
of transfers. But we argue here that there are significant  tradeoffs between a move to a
comprehensive  welfare state and a  shift to dynamic growing economies.  The transition
economies  don't have  the underlying  productivity  levels  (in  terms  of real productivity  in a global
market)  or tax bases  to sustain  the tax effort needed to provide  transfers  on a very large scale.
Short-run  gains in security could be at high long-run costs--in  insufficient  private and public
capital  accumulation  and lack  of competitiveness.  This could  pan out either in terms of financial
collapse--Ukraine  is an early example-or an extreme form of Eurosclerosis  at low levels  of
income.  Under  either scenario  it is likely  that the poor, the old, the disabled,  the unemployed-
precisely  those that transfers are supposed  to protect-will suffer disproportionately  over the
medium-  to long-term,  and probably  even in the short term.
The choice  between  security  and growth is one that each society  faces. The purpose  of
this paper has been to illustrate  the character of the tradeoffs. In a viable scenario, it is, of
course, likely  that transfers  will be irnportant  for both  welfare  and  political  reasons.  We disuss
some of  the options for providing transfers that are  more likely to be  consistent with
macroeconomic  imperatives  and have  relatively  low adverse  incentive  effects  - for  example,  flat-
rate pensions  (or flatter) at quite low replacement  rates, a lower dole or severance  pay, and
localized  rather than generalized  (income-tested)  social assistance.  We emphasize the use of
intrinsically  temporary  measures-such as temporary employment  schemes-to deal with the
transition  period. Such an approach  inevitably  puts more pressure  on private coping and will,
in the short run, increase  risk. This could be the cost of a viable transition  to the future rapid
growth that is key to overall success.
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